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This document contains the conceptual design review material of the SNAP-8
Power Conversion System. This material was prepared by the Power Systems Opera-
tion of the Aerojet Nuclear Systems Company under HASA Contract MAS 3-13^ 58.
The conceptual design and supporting analysis indicate that no significant
change in scope or technical emphasis is required to meet the goal of delivering
a PCS for combined systems test in the Plumbrook facility.
Approval of the Design Review Board to proceed to detail design is requested.
PCS CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REVIEW
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INTRODUCTION
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1. Conical PCS with Reactor Sliadov Shield
2. Conical PCS with l»1f Shield
3. Rectangular Parallelepiped PCS vith kff Shield
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lo System Schematic
2« Recluadancy Trsde-of:? Studies
B, OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF LAYOUT
lo Component Arrangement
2. Piping Arrangement
3» Electrical Eubaaseaibly Description
4. Interface Locations
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PCS CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The SNAP-8 Electrical Generating System configuration has evolved from a
shadow-shielded reactor vlth conical PCS to a 4-pi shielded reactor with a
rectangular parallelepiped PCS, This report will discuss the conceptual design
of the current concept. Figures IA1 to lAk in this section present illustra-
tions of the various EGS concepts which have been considered,. Figures IB1 and
IB2 portray the current concept with "straight" and "a-shaped" boilers <> Either
configuration is compatible with the PCS concept being presented. The final
boiler configuration will be selected during the post-conceptual design review
phase..
Figures HI and IB2 in this section show the fully redundant Power
Conversion System concept with the boiler concepts currently under consideration-.
The overall envelope is a rectangular parallelepiped. Although all PCS eottponeut
are shown, the Combined System Test PCS will include only one set of PCS sub-
systems. The concept shewn is designed primarily for accessibility for component
maintenanceo Mechanical components can be replaced through the front face of
.»
the PCS,and electrical modules would be serviced from the top of the unit* The
PCS mates with the facility at the lower plane of the PCS, although it is de-
signed for lifting from the top plane for handling purposes without the RPL,
radiator, and shield,,
The PCS structure is a basic truss configuration which enhances the
maintainability of the system and provides the structure end components tfith s
view of the cold sink. The piping configuration accommodates thermal growth of
the Interconnecting piping between components without use of bellowso
The design ground rules, which form the basis for this PCS concept,, are
presented in Figure Id.
SNAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM WITH SHADOW SHIELDED REACTOR
SNAP-8 COMBINED SYSTEM TEST-NASA PLUMBROOK SPF
PCS WITH BOILERS IN THE REACTOR COOLANT LOOP
70 ~ Oo $L
SMAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM AND NUCLEAR SYSTEM
l W " 0
;VSTI
FIGURE IA-4
SNAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM


































































































































































































































































EGS FLOW SCHEMATIC AND STATE-FOIST
The hydraulic schematic shown in Figure IIA1 was developed during the
past 7~8 months to factor the following major changes into the SNAP-8 concept:
o Inclusion of the intermediate heat exchanger
o Removal of the boilers from within the "biological shield
o Inclusion of EM Pumps in the Primary Loop
The state-point described in Figure IIAl-1 reflects the following changes
in SNAP-8 requirements{
o Increased net electrical output of 50 Kwe (minimum)
o Reactor outlet temperature (nominal) reduced to 1220 F
o Reduced turbine back-pressure to 0 psia
This new state-point required that the boiler, turbine, and mercury pump motor
assembly designs be modified.
Figure IIA1-2 describes the reference low-pressure-injection start system
which was designed for the boilers-in-the-galley SNAP-8 concept. A qualitative
assessment of the modified SNAP-8 indicates that the reference startup concept




























































SNAP-8 ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
SUBJECT.
PCS-G STATE POINT CONDITIONS - Revision date lf/21/70
ABSTRACT:
1. As a result of the meeting with NASA on ^ /15/70, system and component changes
were agreed to which affect the PCS-G state point conditions. Therefore, the state
'point conditions of 3/3/70 (Ref. SA 0030) are superseded by information presented
herein and on the accompanying diagrams, SA O0l*2/Fl & F2.
2. The following items represent the latest information:
Turbine: 65$ efficiency.
Boiler: double contained, multiple tube with swirl wire.
AP - 35 psi withATpp = 35°F at design condition
Reactor Power: assume 600 KWT available to intermediate loop and no heat
losses from reactor loop.
Condenser: assume condenser will operate satisfactorily with NaK inlet
temperature, approx. Ul5°F (mercury side will be operating at
choked conditions).
3. State-point conditions have been defined, using the information in Paragraph 2,
for the system design condition (at reactor lower deadband temperature, see Fig.#l)
and for an off-design condition (at reactor upper deadband temperature, see Fig.$2).
All significant system temperature, pressure, flow and power values have been entered
on the appropriate state-point diagrams.
k. It should be noted that condenser operating conditions have been estimated by
preliminary evaluation of recent condenser mapping tests conducted with PCS-1. The
condenser conditions will be updated after a complete evaluation of the test data.
It is expected that only minor changes in condenser temperature and NaK flow
conditions will result.
5. The results of the latest state-point iteration show that the lowest net elec-
trical, power (52.3 KWe) occurs at the reactor upper deadband condition, but the
system must be designed for the lower reactor deadband temperature condition when
the net electrical power is S^ .P KWp
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PCS-G Restart Component Requirements - Part I Specification
B. L. Amstadter, W. F. Banks, S. L. Bradley, B. Breindel, E. G. Brittain,
E, S. Chalpin, M. G. Cherry, F. N. Collamore, F. Curtis, R. S. Foley,
C. L. Foss, D. W. Kowell, D. E. Knittle, L. P. Lopez, R. W. Marshall,
J. R. Pope, R. G. Rivera, D. R. Ward,
NASA-LeRC: F. Boecker, E. R. Fur-man, K. G. Hurrell, A. W. Nice,
M. J. Saari, J. H. Shank, A. Stromquist, G. M. Thor
NASA-Hq.: P. R. Miller
NAVFLANTREP/NASA-COR: J. D. Gentry
NASA-PLUM BROOK: C. J. Daye
(1) PCS-G Restart System Schematic
(2) Mercury Injection Reservoir and Actuating System
Restart System Valve Requirements
Heat Rejection Loop Flow Control Valve Requirements
(5) Programmer Requirements
This memorandum transmits the latest revisions to the component require-
ments for the restart system and the startup and shutdown sequences derived from analysis
and test results.
The requirements are based on a low pressure mercury injection system
which is actuated by the differential pressure generated "by the 1£ .PM4. The require-
ments do not take into account the effect* of recently discussed system •^ f\£ya' relat*d
to incorporation of a cold vail circuit ia the pffiaury loop tc provide fear cacfceraftl
reactor cool ing. . .
It is reqoestad that Part I component specifications be prepared or re-
vised and that Use system specification AGC-10512 b« revised tp reflect tte overall
system requirements Inclnfloft in the enclosures* :
The cognizant Task Managers are requested to review the enclosed material








Power Systems Department Fig. II A .1-2 a
Enclosure (2)
Mercury Injection Reservoir and Actuating System
A, General Purpose and Operation
I* The restart system for PCS-G requires the use of a reservoir which acts
to store, supply, and receive mercury during repeated operating cycles of startup
and shutdown.
2, Pressure for injecting mercury into the loop, upstream of the Hg PMA,
will be supplied by an actuating system. The actuating system consists of a hydraulic
piston which operates from the differential pressure generated by the LCPMA. The
direction of movement of the actuator piston and, therefore, the mercury reservoir
diaphragm is controlled by the mercury reservoir actuator valve (MRAV)- The mercury
injection pressure is determined by the ratio of the reservoir diaphragm area to the
hydraulic piston area. The mercury reservoir and actuating system is shown schemati-
cally in Figure 2-1.
3, A diaphragm position sensor in the nercury reservoir will be used to indicate
when the proper amount of mercury has been injected into the loop.
U. During normal shutdown the majority of the mercury loop inventory will be
pumped back into the mercury reservoir by the Hg PMA through the mercury reservoir
recharge valve (MRRV), As a final step the remainder of the logo inventory will be
returned to the mercury reservoir by actuating the mercury reservoir actuator valve
to the "dump" position thereby driving the mercury reservoir diaphragm to the maximum
volume position and providing a ,low pressure sink, Tne remaining loop inventory wij.i
return to the reservoir through the mercury injection valve.
51 During emergency shutdowns the mercury loop inventory will be returned to
the mercury reservoir by actuating the mercury reservoir actuator valve to the"dump"
position thereby making the reservoir a low pressure sink. The loop inventory will
return to the reservoir through the mercury injection valve.
B, Design and Operational Requirements
1, Mercury Injection Reservoir (KIR)
a0 The reservoir shall be designed to contain mercury at temperatures in
the range of 50r to 600 r and sized to expel 320 pounds of liquid at a temperature
of 5KTF.
b. The reservoir shall be designed to withstand internal pressures up to
75 psia,
c. The design shall be such that intermixing of the actuating fluid arid the
mercury which will be expelled into the system can occur only if a double failure oi


























d. The reservoir shall contain a diaphragm position sensor for determining
the quantity of mercury expelled from the reservoir during any injection cycle. The
position sensor shall provide on electrical signal proportional to the position of the
diaphragm from the zero to full inventory positions.
e. Assuming the mercury reservoir is designed in a cylindrical shape, the
height of the cylinder should be minimized so as to reduce the effect of mercury ele-
vation head, differences on the reservoir outlet pressure, However, the height of
the reservoir must be consistent with the requirement to measure the amount of inven-
tory injected to within ± 3 pounds*
f. The mercury reservoir port shali. be furnished with a veld stub for bvtt
type welding to 1.0" x -,OU9 wall ORES 316 SS tubing. A fill and servicing port shall
also be provided which shali be compatible with TSE requirements (to be determined)
and shall not incorporate any valves permanently attached to the reservoir,
2. Mercury Reservoir Actuator
a. The mercury reservoir actuator shall consist of bellows-sealed chcmbers
filled with lubricant/coolant fluid (Mix UP3S) and separated by a piston. The chambers
shall be designed to withstand fluid pressures up to 100 psia with fluid temperatures
from 50T? to 250 F,
b- The actuator will develop a force by a differential pressure of 70 psi
(produced by the LC PMA) acting across the actuator piston.
c<> The actuator must be of a flexible design to permit use in applications
where the gravity field may be x-rithin the range of 0 "g" to 1.5 "g". The gravity field
will be constant for any specific application. The flexibility requirement is reflected
in the need to generate pressures at the mercury reservoir outlet oi' from 13 »0 psia when
in a 0 "g" application to 38.U psia when in a 1.5 "g" application, The flexibility may
be achieved by means such as utilizing actuator pistons of different diameters with
mating sleeves to match a fixed housing diameter. The housing size should be based on
the requirement that a 70 psi actuator differential pressure ./ill produce 3&.^  psia at
the mercury reservoir outlet
d. The initial actuator design shall be for a 1 "g" application thereby
requiring a mercury reservoir outlet pressure of 29.9 psia«
e. Lealsage of fluid (Mix ^ P3E) across the actuator piston with a differentiel
pressure of 70 psi shall be kept to a minimum. .
f. The fluid ports in the two actuator chambers shall be furnished with weld





B. Mercury Reservoir Actuator Valve (MRAV)
1. The valve required to direct fluid to the mercury reservoir actuator shall
be a four-way, two-position, solenoid operating latching valve using 28 vdc power.
2. The valve shall be designed to operate with lubricant/coolant flgid (Mix
1*P3E) at pressures up to 100 psit with fluid temperatures from 50 F to 250 F.
3. The valve ports shall t e provided with weld stubs for butt type welding to
1/2" x .0^9 wall GEES 316 SS tubing.
1*. Flow passages within the valve shall have cross-sectional areas equivalent to
1/2" x .01*9 wall tubing.
5. Leakage between flow passages within the valve shall be kept to a minimum
when operating with differential pressures up to 70 psi.





RESTART STSTEM VALVE RSQUIRIMENTS
The PCS-G- restart system requires the use of eight valves during various phases
of startup and shutdown. The valves ,are required with mercury» eutectic NaK or
Mix U?3E as the service fluid. The specific requirements for each valve are identified
in the following paragraphs.
A. Mercury Flow Control Valve (MFCV)
The requirements for the mercury flow control valve are contained in Speci
fication AGC-1062?, "Valve, Motor Driver., Flow-Control, Mercury, 600T"','with the
following exceptions:
I* The valve can be cpnsidc-:red to have three operating regions as defined
in Figure 3-A. Each of these operating regions is utilized when the valve is operated
to open and when it is operated to close.
2o The first operating region, region A as shown in Figure 3-A., provides
for opening the valve to an initial flow Bitting of 360 J.b/hr (approximately 3$ rated
flow), The valve must be capable of stopping at this position during either the
opening or closing cycle aad providing the reqvdred flow rate to within ±5$. The
voltage required to move the valve to this position frca the full closed position maj-
be any constant value up to 28 vdc.
3« The seccad operating regiou, region B as shown in Figure 3-As provide:;
for increasing the flow rate to an intermediate value of 6600 Ib/hr in a rapid linear
function. The valve must be capable of stopping at this position during either the
opening or closing cycle and providing the required flow rate to within ±2$, The
time required to make the flow change during region B operation must be variable be-
tween 30 and 100 seconds. The voltage required to move the valve during this period
and over the tine range specified may be any constant value up to 28 vdc.
U. The third operating region, region C as shown in. Figure 3-A, provides
for increasing the flow rate to a maximum value of 13> 500 Ib/hr in a slow linear
function. The valve must be capable of providing the required flow rate at the full
open position to within -^Jk* The time required to moke the flow change dur.ing region
C operation must be variable between 500 and 1200 seconds. The voltage required to
move the valve during this period and over the time range specified may be any con-
stant value up to 28 vdc.
5. The orifice characteristics for the mercury flow control valve will be
modified in the future. The characteristics as specified on Figure 1 in AGC-I062?
are to be used as a guide only for general trends.




B. Mercury Boiler Isolation Valve (MBIV)
The requirements for the mercury boiler isolation valve can be obtained
from Specification AGC-10638, "Valve, Shut-Off» 28 vdc, Two Position" with exceptions,
Most of the valve requirements are met by the valve specified as AGC-10638-12^ . The
significant exception is that although the normal service fluid temperature is 500 Fs
the environmental temperature will normally be ISOO^ 1. The environmental temperature;
can exist with and without fluid flowing through the valve throughout the operating
life.
C. Mercury Condenser Isolation Valve (M3IV)
The requirements for the mercury condenser isolation valve can be obtained
from Specification AGC-10638, "Valve, Shut-Off, 28 vdc, Two Position".. The valve
requirements are met by the valve specified as AGC-10638-222.
D. Mercury Injection Valve (MIV)
The requirements for the mercury injection valve can be obtained from
Specification 10638, "Valve, Shut-Off, 28 vdc, Two Position". The valve requirements:
are met by the valve specified as AGO-10638-222.
E. Mercury Reservoir Recharge Valve (MRRV)
The requirements for the mercury reservoir recharge valve can be obtained
from Specification AGC-10638, "Valve, Shut-Off, 28 vdc» Two Position". The valve
requirements are met by the valve specified as AGC-10638-12U.
P. Mercury Reservoir Actuutor Valve (MRAV)
The requirements for the mercury reservoir actuator valve are contained in
Enclosure (2) of this memorandum.
G, Auxiliary Loop Shut-Off Valve (ALSV)
The requirements for the auxiliary loop shut-off valve can be obtained froat
Specification AGC-10638, "Valve, Shut-Off, 28 vdc, Two Position"„ The valve require-
ments are met by the valve specified as AGC-10638-233.
H. Heat Rejection Loop Plow Controf Valve (HRFCV)
The requirements for the heat rejection loop flow control valve are contained
in Enclosure (U) of this memorandum.



















Heat Rejection Loop Plow Control Valve (HRPCV) Requirements
A. General Purpose and Operation
1, The restart system for PCS-G requires the use of a flow control valve for
the beat rejection loop flow through the condenser. The initial and final positions
and movement of the valve will be controlled by electrical signals from the PCS-G
programmer,
2, Prior to mercury injection, the HRFCV will be signalled to move from the
fully closed position to an initial flow position wliieh will provide for a minimun
initial flow through the condenser, The valve position will not be changed throughout
the reactor startup and mercury injection periods until the condenser pressure reaches
a value of lU psia. After the condenser pressure reaches lh psia the HRFCV will be
signalled to move, at a constant rate, in a direction to increase the flow through
the condenser if the condensing pressure exceeds the upper liiiit (it psia} of a dead-
band control range, in a direction to decrease the flow through the condenser if the
condensing pressure is below the lower limit value (11 psia) of the deadband control
range or to remain stationary if the condenser pressure stays within the upper and
lower limit values,
3, After startup has proceeded to the point where rated mercury flow is obtained,
the HRPCV will be signalled to xoove to the fully open position which will establish
rated flow in the heat rejection loop.
U, During shutdown, the HRFCV will be signalled to mow in a manner so as to
maintain condensing pressure within the deadband control range, Electrical signals
will be provided by the programmer to nove the vclve, at c constant rate, in the
proper direction. (The valve will tend to be signalled to move in a direction to
decrease the flow through the condenser.)
5- After shutdown of the mercury loop the HRFCV will be signalled to move to
the fully closed position.
B. Design and Operational Requirements
1, The majority of the requirements for the heat rejection loop flow contro.l
valve are contained in Specification AGC-1061tO, "Valve, Motor Driven, Flow-Con t:rO;..,
NaK, 6OO f"t with the following exceptions:
a. The valve will be required to operate over the range of positions fro:u
full closed to full open and control the flow over a range from 0 to to
 5 000 Ibs/hr,
When in the full closed the leakage across the seat shall not exceed 1000 cc/or of





b. When signalled to move in either direction, the valve shall be
designed to move at a nominal rate corresponding to 0.35$ of full travel per
second when supplied vith dc power at a constant voltage. The rate of movement
P^Q.T be adjustable so that the valve can be made to move over a range of from
50$ slower to twice as fast as the nominal, rate. Changing the voltage supplied
to the valve may be used as. a method for •varying the rate of movement of the
valve over the range specified.
c. When the valve is in the full open position the pressure drop across
the valve shall not exceed 3.0 psi with a NaK flow rate of Uo,000 Ib/hr. •
d. Plots of valve pressure drop, flow rate and effective area as functions
of percentage of full travel are presented in Figures 3-H-l and 3-H-2. These figures
supercede Figure 1 of Specification AGC-106UO.
Figure II A 1-2 k





L» This document specifies the system requirements for the PCS-G programmer.
The programmer for the PCS-G is an assemblage of electromechanical devices
packaged in a container. The purpose of the programmer is to time and control
the. various events and sequences associated with the normal startup/ normal
shutdown, emergency shutdown, and decay heat removal operating modes of the
PCS-G* Logic circuitry, timers ind associated relays, necessary to produce
Various signals to perform the events called out In the sequences described
later in this document, must operate in conjunction with signals received
from various sensors in the PCS, signals from the nuclear system controller
and external command signals.
2. The programmer will be activated by remote signals from the facility control
console or the astronaut's control console. The signals shall cause the pro-
grammer to perform the following major functions:
a. Provide a startup signal for the nuclear system controller.
b. Startup the PCS.
c. Normal shutdown of the PCS«
d. Provide a signal to the nuclear system controller for normal shutdown.
e. Emergency shutdown of the PCS.
f» Provide a signal to the nuclear system controller for emergency shutdown.
i
g. Trim (or adjust) mercury inventory.
Signals to the programmer are carried through electrical conductors from
several sources. Power to the programmer will be unregulated 28 vdc power (nominal)
from either a battery or facility power supply.
3* The programmer shall control the operation of the following equipment:
a. Provide 28 vdc power (unregulated) to the nuclear system controller.
b. Control the inverter frequency at 1*5 Hz and. over the range from 95 Hz to
220 Hz. Control the output voltage of the inverter (high, medium, and
low) by controlling a contact actuator which is part of the inverter
assembly.
c. Control the motor transfer contactors to start the PNPMA, the LCPMA, and
the HRLPMA at 1*5 Hz.




d. Control the motor transfer contactor such that the primary, HRL, and
LC PMA's may be jointly switched from inverter to alternator at a
specific alternator frequency (nominally 220 Hz) „ The frequency
sensing circuits shall be part of the programmer.
e. Control the position of the MPCV from a full-closed position to a
full-open position. The opening of the Hg FCV shall be accomplished
in three stages.
f . Control the operation of the TAA and Hg PMA bearing prelube subsystem.
g. Control the two TAA L/C solenoid valves.
h. Control the two Kg PMA L/C solenoid valves.
i. Control the mercury injection system valves to open or close.
3* Provide the necessary controlled field flashing current for the alternator,
k. Provide the necessary initial "off" bias for the saturable reactor.
1. Control the actuation of the TAA and Hg PMA lift-off seals.
m. Control the vehicle load breaker to be open or closed.
n. Control the operation of the HRFCV.
o~ Control the LCL heaters.
p. Control opening of the mercury condenser isolation valve (MCIV) and closing
of the mercury injection valve (MTV) upon receipt of signals that:
(l) Condensing pressure has reached a minijmna value of 3.5 psia.
(2) A m-tnitmm amount of mercury has been injected into the mercury loop,
The amount of mercury injected will be determined by an indication
from the mercury injection reservoir (MIR) diaphragm position sensor
that the MIR diaphragm has moved a specified distance.
h. The programmer shall accept the following signals while performing required
functions : . .
a. Frequency signal from TAA.
b. Condenser pressure signal (0-p volt),




d. Signal indicating flow rates in the heat rejection and primary loops.
e. Signal indicating TAA output voltage (0-5 volt),
f „ Relay closure signal from the nuclear system controller indicating that
the reactor is in a shutdown mode.
g. Relay closure signal from the nuclear system controller indicating that
the reactor is operating on long-term control.. Ibis signal shall be
28 ± h vdc 100 milliamperes for a minimum of j}0 milliseconds to a
of 30 seconds.
h. Alternator output electrical power level signal (0-5 volt) -
The programmer shall provide signals as follows:
a, One ampere inductive 28 vdc rated contact closure signal to the nuclear
system controller upon failure of the PCS..
b, One cmperc 28 vdc rated contact closure signal to the nuclear system
controller upon receipt of an automatic or manual shutdown signal to
the programmer,
6. The programmer shall include all of the necessary timer? and logic circuitry
to perform the following major functions:
an Normal startup - see Appendix A for detailed sequence,
V
b., Normal shutdown - see Appendix B for detailed sequence,
c, Baereency shutdown - see Appendix C for detailed sequence.
d. Mercury inventory trim - At various times during steady-state system operation
the mercury loop inventory will require adjustment (trimming), When inventory
adjustment is required an external signal will be supplied to the programier
(e.g., from the astronaut's console). Upon receipt of this signal the pro-
grammer shall perform the following functions:
(1) Provide a signal to open the mercury injection valve (MIV) ,
(2) Start a 15 minute timer to allow for juercury inventory adjustment end
stabilization of systea transients.
' I i
(3) Provide a signal to close (the mercury injection valve at the end of i;he





7, The components selected for use in the programmer shall meet the environmental
requirements of AGC-1D660. The programmer shall be designed for a minimum life of
1*0,000 hours.
8. The programmer will be provided with coolant (toP3E) at a nominal temperature
of lltQ E, The flow rate required shall be mutually determined between the designed
and systems engineering.




Kormaj. Start Sequence.-,- The PC3-G progr aimer , when provided with 28 vdc power ,-
shall initiate and control the start sequence upon receipt of an external command
signal, The start sequence of events, utilizing the restart system shown in
?igui-e 1 shall be as described below and GS shown diagraanoati sally in Figure A-l.
The "T" numbers in the left-hand column refer to the time periods shown in Figure
A-l.
T-l (l) Provide a s5.gnai to override the emergency shutdown circuits of
(l hour) Conditions 1, 2, 3, arid 5 as listed in paragraph 1 of Appendix C»
(2) Provide a signal to supply power to the LCL heaters to raise 'ohe
fluid fceaperature from 50 P to 121>F.
T-2 (l) Provide a signal to sterr. the inverter with 28 vde pover and j>iai>i-
(10 sec,) tain a speed corresponding to a frequency oi* !»•? Hz,
(2) Provide a signal 'to supp^  power to actuate tfrj HRFCV from the
closed position to the initial flow position,
(3) Provide a. signal to optii the auxiliary loop shut-off valve (ALSV)
(U) Provide a sigJial to supply pover from the inverter high voltage
taps to the PNPMA.
(5) A flow indication signal most "be received by the programmer before
the end of this tiaie period, If no flow signal has been received
tlie programmer shall switch off.
T-3 (l) Provide n signal to supply power from i.'ne inverter high voltage ta;?s
(10 sec,) to the HRLPMA,
T-U (l) Provide a signal to supply power f r«a the inverter high voltage ta^
sec.) ' to the LC IMA0
T-5 (l) Provide a signal to change the siipply pcr'er to the inverter froiu
(1O sec0) 28 vdc to 56 vxlc* The inverter speed wllj. then increase to a valu.-:
which corresponds to an output frequency of 9'.i Hz, Ths inverte.v





Appendix A (Cont'd.) Page 2
T-6 (l) Providfe a signal jto transfer the Pl-IA loads from the high voltage
(1; - 5 to the low voltage tapa of the inverter. (33ie inverter frequency
hours) shall remain at 95 Hz.)
(2) Provide unregulated 28 ±3 vrlc power of 60 to 500 watts to the nuclear
system controller for a period of If H- 1, -0 hours. The nuclear sy,steri
start sequence shall be as specified in AGC-10650 and -shall be con-
trolled by the nuclear system controller,
(3) Provide 28 vdc power to the LCL heaters to gaiss the LCL fluid tgm-
perature from an i:xitia3. temperature of 125 F to 2OCn? + 10 , -0
within one hour. The source of power to the heaters shall be extoi-rui
to the programmer,,
(U) When the temperature of the NaX in the hot leg of the PKL is 1288 -•
1330 JF, the nuclear system controller will switch to the long-term
temperature control mode and send a signal to the PCS-G programmer.
rC?-7 (l) Start a 10 minute-timer to allov for stabilization of the PIIL tern-
(lOmin.) peratures*
(2) Provide a signal to remove the 28 vdc power from the LCL heaters-
(3) Cycle the lift-off seals. Unseat then seat«
T-8 (l) Provide a signal to transfer the H-IA electrical loads to the Bjsdiuir
(5 min.) voltage taps of the inverter.
(2) Provide a signal to increase the inverter speed and frequency- The
inverter speed shall be increased to produce a frequency of 220 Hz:
the frequency shall not increase at a rate faster than 2.0 Hz/sec,
(3) Start a 5 minute timer to allov; for attainment of 220 Hz inverter
frequency.,
(U) Provide a signal to actuate the nercury flow control valve (MFCV) ex
a position corresponding to a fj.ow of approximately 3% of rated.
T-9 (l) Start a 5 minute timer to allow for stabilization of HIL temper&tmv:
(5 rain,,) transients resulting from the pump speed and flow change,
(2) Provide a signal to supply power from the inverter to the Kg FMA«
(3) Provide a signal to open the mercury injection valve (MT/) to per.ait
mercury to flow from the mercury reservoir and fill the lines between
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T-iO (l) Provide a signal to open the mercury boiler isolation valve
(.15 sec,
minimum) (2) Start a j^  second tiarer to permit filling of the boiler inlet
manifold,
(3) Sense mercury reservoir bellows position to obtain reference location-
(10 Provide a signal to open the VIS.
57-11 (l) Provide a signal to open the IWQV to a position equivalent to a flow
(30 sec» rate of 6600 Ib/hr at a nominal rate of 210 ]
(2) Provide a signal to initiate alternator field flashing,
(3) Provide a signal to turn on saturable reactor bias,
(U) Provide a signal to transfer the PMA electrical loads to the alternator
at an alternator frequency of 220 Hz,
(5) Provide a signal to open valves SV-5 and SV-6 at the TAA and prov5.de
a signal to unseat the lift-off seals. The TAA epeed shall be 3000 i-
150 rpia,
(6) Provide a signal to open valves SV-3 and SV-4 at the Hg PMA and provide
a signal to unseat the lift-off seals. The TM speed shall be 8000 *
150 rpm,
(7) Provide a signal to turn off the saturable reactor bias. The TAA
frequency shall be 385 ± 4 Hz*
rj?-12 (l) Start a 10 to 15 minute tiaer to permit stabilization of system
(10 - 15 transients,
min.)
(2) Provide a signal to stop the opening cotion of the MFCV. The MPCV
••< will be in a position to provide o flow rate of 6600 Ib/hr with the
TAA at rated speed.
(3) Provide signals to close the MTV and open the nercury condenser
isolation valve when the mercury reservoir beir.ovs position sensor
indicates a displacement equivalent to the injection of 70 Ib.v of
mercury and fciie condenser pressure sensor indicates a pressure of
3,5 psia has been obtained or exceeded.
Provide pover to the HRFCV upon signal from the condensing pressure
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T-13 (l) Start a 10 to 15 minute tiJKdr to permit increasing the mercury flow
(10 - 15 to rated,
min.)
(2) Provide a signal to turn off ohe alternator field flashing current..
(3) Provide a signal to turn off the inverter power.
(k) Provide a signal to transfer the nuclear systan electrical load to
the alternator,
'«
(5) Provide a oicnal to close the auxllio-ry loop shut-off valve.
(6) Provide a signal to resume oponin-; of the MFCV at a noudual rate of
6.33 Ib/hr/sec. Note: A charge in voltage suxipiied to the MPCV may
also be required at this time.
(7) Provide a signal to open the MIV if the HRFCV reacher. the position
equivalent to rated flow in the heat rejection loop.. Power 3.>;c,pij.3.:.
to the HRFCV shall be removed when the K8FCV reaches the poai-tior:
equivalent to rated flow.
(8) Provide a signal to open the 2-CCV in the event -ihe condertser pressure
exceeds 17 psia and a signal to ciose it when the pressure reduces tc
ih psia.
T-lU (l) Start a 10 to 15 minute timer to permit mercur/ ijotventory trira and
(10 •• 1^  allow system transients to stabilize.
•
(2) Provide a 5.i^ nal to open the IffiFCV to the position equivalent to rate
flow in the heat rejection loop. Power supplied to the HRFCV will l*
removed when the HRFCV reaches the rated flow position-
f "*
(3) Provide a signal to open the MEV0 (This sicnal will oi?en the MT\r
only if the valve was noc actuated previously per item (7) of tisie
period T-13-)
T-15 (l) Provide a signal to close the MTV«
(2) Provide a signal to close the VIB, Rated output power shall have
beer} attained.





































































Normal Shutdown Sequence.- On receipt of an external command signal the normal
shutdown sequence of events shall toe as described below and as shown diagramma-
tically in Figure B-l.
T-l (l) Provide a signal to open the VLB. .
(10-15
minutes) (2) Provide a signal o close the MFCV at a nominal rate of 6.33 Ib/hr/sec.
(3) Activate the KBFCV to control condenser pressure at nominal conditions,
i.e., between 11 and lU psia.
T-2 (l) Provide a signal to stop the MFCV at a position equivalent to a flow
(10 - 15 rate of 6600 Ib/hr.
minutes) .
(2) Start a 10 to 15 minute timer to permit system transients to stabilise
as the reactor power is reduced.
T-3 (l) Provide a signal to resume closing of the MFCV at a rate equivalent
(50 - 150 to 62 Ib/hr/sec. The MFCV will be closed to a position which corresponds
seconds) to a flow of approximately 3% of rated, Note: A change in voltage
supplied to the MFCV may also be required at this time.
(2) Provide a signal to start the inverter and supply 56 vdc power for
operation at 220 Hz.
(3) Provide a signal to transfer the nuclear system electrical load to the
battery.
(U) Provide a signal to open the auxiliary loop shut-off valve (ALSV),
(5) Provide a signal to close valves SV-5 and SV-3 and seat the TAA lift
off seals when the TAA speed decreases to 8000 ± 150 rpm..
i
(6) Provide a signal to close valves SV-6 and SV-U and seat the Hg PMA
lift-off seals when the TAA speed decreases to 8000 ± 150 rpa.
(7) Provide a signal to transfer all PMA electrical loads to the inverter
when the TAA frequency decreases to 220 Hz. Tne TAA frequency will
increase after the electrical loads are transferred. The FMA's should
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T-k (l) Provide a signal t.o start a. 100 to 200 second timer to permit stabill-
(100 - 200 zatioh of system transients. .
seconds)
T-5 (1) Provide a signal to open the mercury reservoir recharge valve
(100 - 200 . (MRRV). ..
seconds)
(1) Provide a signal to close the MRRV.
(10 sec,)
(2) Provide a signal to open the MIV.
(3) Provide a shutdown signal to the nuclear system controller to initiate
a reactor fast setback.
(U) Provide a.signal to remove the Hg PMA electrical load from the inverter.
(5) Provide a signal to actuate the mercury reservoir actuator valve (MRAV)
to the "dump" position.
(6) Provide a signal to actuate the MFCV to the full closed position.
(7) Provide a signal to close the mercury boiler isolation valve (MBIV).
T-7 (l) Provide a signal to reduce the inverter frequency to 95 Hz at a rate
(5 min.) not to exceed 2.0 Hz/sec.
T-8 (l) Provide a signal to transfer the PMA electrical loads to the low
(8 hours) voltage taps of the inverter.
(2) Continue operation of PMA's at 95 Hz for 8 hours.
T-9 (l) Provide a signal to actuate the HKFCV to the full closed position.
.(100 sec.) Power supplied to the HRFCV shall be removed when the valve reaches
the full closed position.
(2) 'Provide a signal to close the mercury condenser isolation valve (MCIV).
(3) Provide a signal to remove the PMA electrical loads from the inverter.
(10 Provide a signal to remove dc power from the inverter.
(5) Provide a signal to close the ALSV.
(6) Provide a signal to close the mercury injection valve (MIV).
T-10 (l) Reset the programmer for startup, then remove power from the programmer.













































































































































































































1. Emergency Shutdown Conditions.- The system shall shut down in accordance with
the emergency shutdown sequence when the following conditions occur:
Condition 1. *PNL flow decay to 50% of nominal (anytime after TAA reaches rated
speed during startup and anytime prior to TAA deceleration to
220 Hz on shutdown).
Condition 2, *ML flow decay to 10$ of nominal during startup prior to tine
when TAA reaches rated speed.
Condition 3» *HRL flow decay to 10$ of nominal (anytime after completion of
startup sequence and prior to initiation cf shutdown sequence).
Condition k, *TAA frequency equal to or greater than 1*1*0 Hz,
Condition 5-> *(U-UV2) Undervoltage - Unbalanced voltage conditions specified
in TM 1*936:68-537 for manned applications.
Condition 6. C^ondenser pressure greater than 1*0 psia*
Condition 7» Reactor fast setback signal.
Condition 8. External command,
2, Emergency Shutdown Sequence.- Upon receipt of a proper emergency condition signal
the programmer shall shut down the system iu the following sequence:
T-l (l) Transfer the nuclear system electric&l load to the battery»
(3 seconds)
(2) Provide a signal to the nuclear system controller to initin ^ e
a reactor fast setback.
(3) Start the inverter on 56 vdc battery power for 220 Hz operation.
(1*) Close the mercury boiler isolation v&lve (MBIV) *
*
(5) Open the mercury condenser isolation valve (MCIV) <,
* (Two out of three separate sensors associated with this measurement are required














(6) Provide a signal to fully close the MPCV using maximum
allowable voltage.
(7) Provide a signal to actuate the mercury reservoir actuator
valve (MRAV) to the "dump" position.
(8) Open the mercury injection valve (MEV)0
(9) Open the VLB.
(10) Open the auxiliary loop shut-off valve (ALSV).
(11) Activate the HRFCV (operation to be determined).
(12) Turn off saturnblc reactor bias.
(13) Close valves SV-5 and SV-6 and seat the TAA lift-off seals.
(HO Close valves SV-3 and SV-U and seat the Hg PMA lift-off seels,
(15) Start a 3 second timer to provide a delay between indication
of emergency shutdown condition and transfer of PMA's to the
inverter.
(l) Transfer the PMA electrical loads to the inverter. The PMA
electrical loads shall not transfer back to the alternator
if the TAA speed subsequently increases above 220 Hz,
(l) Provide a signal to reduce the inverter frequency to 95 Hz
at a rate not to exceed 2.0 Hz/sec.
(1) Provide a signal to transfer the PMA electrical loads to the
low voltage taps of the inverter.
(2) Provide a signal to remove the Hg PMA from the inverter.
(3) Continue operation of the HI, HRL, and LC PMA's at 95 Hz
for 8 hours.
(1) Provide a signal to actuate the HRFCV to the full closed
position. Power supplied to the HRFCV shall be removed
when the valve reaches the full closed position.
(2) ProvideTa signal to close the mercury condenser isolation
valve (M3IV),
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(U) Provide a signal to remove dc power from the inverter.
(5) Provide a signal to close the ALSV.
(6) Provide a signal to actuate the mercury reservoir actuator
valve to the "normal" position.
T-6 (l) Reset the programmer for startup, then remove power from the
programmer..
3. ;In the event of an external electrical fault as signified by U-UVI, the VLB shall
be cycled. This system concept shall be as defined in TM 4936:68-537 for the manned
application.
Pig. IIA l-2ab
PCS REDUNDANCY CONSIDERATIONS ' .
It has been a program gound-rule.since 1966 for SNAP-8 to contain redun-
dancy features wherever feasible. This requirement developed simultaneously
with the "man rating" of SNAP-8. Consequently-, the concept of redundant Hg
loops and primary PMAs is an inherent part of the SNAP-8 EGS. During the
current conceptual design phase, further analysis of redundancy features was
performed. The following items represent the highlights of our redundancy analysis.
1. HRL. The flow diagrams shown in Figure IIA2-1 indicate that some
simplification can be achieved by utilizing the single HRL circuit. However,
the analysis shown in Figure IIA2-2 indicates that higher reliabilities can be
achieved with a dual radiator -- therefore, dual HRL approach. It must be noted,
that such higher reliabilities can only be achieved with (l) heavily armored
radiators and (2) highly reliable KRL and Hg L components.
2. L/C Loop. The quantitative analysis made for the HRL loop apply
qualitatively to the L/C loop; hence, the decision to use two separate L/C
circuits (shown in Figure IIA2-3) versus the single circuit approach (shown in
Figure IIA2-4).
3. Electrical Controls. Figure IIB3-4 in Section'IIB is an electrical
block diagram representing the reference controls for one PCS in a dual PCS
design. A similar set is required for the second PCS. Figure IIA2-5 shows an
arrangement whereby a single set of electrical equipment (with the exception of
the programmer) can be used to serve two PCSs. The switchgear required in the
latter case represents a decrease in reliability over the reference approach.
A comparison of the various methods of arranging programmers, electrical
controls, and PCSs is indicated in Figure IIA2-6. The choice of two programmers
over one to control two PCSs is based on the excessive amount of switchgear
required for the one programmer approach. A comparison of system 2B versus system
IB in Figure IIA2-6 supports the decision of selecting the independent electrical
system approach since the total amount of switchgear is reduced.
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IMTRODUCTION:
A further analysis of the relative reliabilities of single- and dual-tube
radiator systems was performed, taking into account not only the HR loop
but also the Hg loop. The analysis employed mathematical models compar-
able to those delineated in TM 5282:69-608. Radiator weights, armor
thicknesses, and probabilities of meteoroid penetrations are calculated
in the same manner as shown in the TM. Figure 1 depicts associated
logic diagrams and Figures 2 through 13 provide pictorial reliability
comparisons.
DISCUSSION:
1. The following points pertain to the four logic diagrams in Figure 1.
A. . Separate PCS systems from boiler through radiator
. When failure occurs, entire PCS is switched over
. No valves; 2 simple or 1 complex auxiliary start heat
exchanger, dual-tube radiator
. Simple condenser
B. . Separate Hg loops from boiler through condenser
. Separate HR loops from condenser through radiator
. Each HR loop goes through both condensers in series
. Complex condensers, with 1 Hg and 2 independent NaK paths
. No valves; 2 simple or 1 complex auxiliary start heat
exchanger
. Either HR loop .can be used with either Hg loop
. Dual-tube radiator
C. . Separate Hg loops from boiler through condenser
- •• Separate HR loops for NaK PMA
. 2 Double Solenoid NaK isolation valves in each HR loop -
no leakage permitted (2 3-way valves can be used in
place of the h 2-way valves)
. 2 simple or 1 complex auxiliary start heat exchanger
- . Dual-tube radiator; simple condensers
. Either HR loop can be used with either Hg loop
Fig. II A 2-2 a
D. . Separate Hg loops.frcan boiler through condenser
. Single HE loop with redundant NaK PMAs
. HR loop can be used with either Hg loop
. Simple 2-position flapper valve, internal leakage permitted
. Simple auxiliary start heat exchanger
. Single tube radiator, simple condensers
2. Because of the impracticality of the condenser design in
configuration B °and the requirement for four leak-proof NaK
valves in configuration C, the analysis was limited to
comparisons of configurations A and D. Configuration A has
two independent sets of Hg loop and HR loop components. Any
failure in the first set requires switching the entire set of
components. Configuration D consists of two sets of Hg loop
components, two HR NPMAs and 1 radiator. Either NPMA can be
used with either Hg loop. A simple flapper valve, not re-
quiring internal leak tightness, and having a very high
reliability is the only additionally required mechanical
component.
3. The analysis is depicted graphically in Figures 2 through 13.
The solid lines represent system reliability (failure proba-
bility) for dual-tube radiators. Since each set of Hg and HR
loop components are in.series and there are no crossovers,
the total reliability of one set of these components (excluding
the radiator which is a separate variable) is evaluated as a
single number.
The shaded area represents the possible system reliabilities
associated with a single-tube radiator system of equal weight.
The total reliability of one set of Hg and HR loop components
(excluding the radiator) is the same as for the dual-tube
configuration. However, because crossover is possible
between the Hg loops and the HR NPMAs, the total reliability
of this set of components is divided into two parts whose
product provides the same total as above. If the reliabilities
of the Hg loop and NPMAs are equal, the upper Limit of the
shaded area is obtained. If all of the probability of failure
is associated with either the Hg loop components or the HR
NPMA and the other part is perfect (again giving the same
total), the lower limit is obtained. Due to the relative
reliabilities of the various -components, it is estimated that
the overall reliability of a 'single-tube radiator system will
be approximately in the middle of the shaded area.
Fig. II A 2-2 b
U. The reliability goal of .95 for the SNAP-8 System for 5 years using
redundant mercury loops and HE PMAs leads to a reliability require-
ment of about .99 for the redundant Hg loops and HR PMAs, .99 for
the radiator, and .97 for the reactor and remaining components.
Using the .99 value for the redundant loops and HR PMAs, each set
must have a reliability of about .90. This is considered to be a
realistic goal for a Uo.,000 hour life.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis shows, Figures 2 through 13, that for anticipated reliability
values of the Hg loop components and WaK PMAs (.85 to .95 total), the
single-tube radiator configuration results in a significant advantage.
For light weight radiators, (approximately 2500 pounds) a reduction in
failure probability of about 2/3 (1/3 as much) as compared with the dual-
tube configuration. As the radiator weight increases, the overall
.reliability also increases, but the advantage of the single-tube
configuration is reduced. For heavy radiators (approximately 5000 pounds),
the single-tube configurations failure probability is about 3/^  of that of
the dual-tube, or a reduction of about 1/U. The average failure probability
of the single-tube configuration is about one-half of that for the dual.-tube
for those weights and component reliability values that are most probable.
(Note that this analysis does not include electrical components. Based on
analytical analyses and actual tests, their reliabilities should be very
high, approaching unity. However, the little unreliability will slightly
reduce the significant advantage of the single-tube configuration, but
not enough to invalidate the conclusions.)
B, L. Amstadter, Supervisor
Design Assurance
Power Systems Department.





























COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE-AND DUAL-TUBE RADIATOR SYSTEMS OF EQUAL WEIGHT
SINGLE LINE = RELIABILITY OF DUAL-TUBE RADIATOR SYSTEM
SHADED .iREA = RANGE OF RELIABILITY OF SINGLE-TUBE RADIATOR SYSTEM
(Reliability = 1.00 - Probability of System Failure)
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Figure 2
T5




'Fig. II A 2-2e
COMPARISON OF.RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE-AND DUAL-TUBE RADIATOR SYSTEMS OF EQUAL WEIGHT
SINGLE LINE = RELIABILITY OF DUAL-TUBE RADIATOR SYSTEM
SHADED AREA =• RANGE OF RELIABILITY OF SINGLE-TUBE RADIATOR SYSTEM
(Reliability = 1.00 - Probability of System Failure)
VB t30 fl ! .§0 .60 .yo vz .60 C'i .906 8.93 9 .95 .96 .97 vt .98 s'i & 001
99•01 ,10
PRODUCT OF RELIABILITIES OF ONE NAK PMA AND ONE MSRCURY LOOP
Figure 3
R
'one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .910
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single-tube radiator = .9950
Radiator Weight (pounds) = 251?
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ENGINEERING AMLYSIS OF ELECTRICAL CONTROLS INTO PCS-G MOD-A
E - Electrical System Excluding Programmer
P - Programmer
PCS - Power Conversion System
1-1 set of electrical controls A
2-2 sets of controls, 1 for each PCS B
3 - 2 sets of controls> interchangeable C
1 programmer







1. Control Transfer Contacts
la. Valve Transfer Contacts
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1. Control Transfer Contacts
la. Valve Transfer Contacts
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1. Control Transfer Contacts
la. Valve Transfer Contacts
































1. Control Transfer Contacts
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System 3A
1. Control Transfer Contacts
la. Valve Transfer Contacts








1. Control Transfer Contacts
la. Valve Transfer Contacts
2. Emergency Shutdovr. Transfer Contacts
3. Control Diodes
3a. Valve Diodes
System 3Ca x— \
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1. Control Transfer Contacts
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 B> L. Amstadter
TITLE. SNAP-8 Single Versus Double Tube Radiator Reliability Analysis
ABSTRACT
This technical memorandum documents a study of the reliabilities of two
alternative PCS-G heat rejection loop configurations, reflecting two radiator
design concepts. The ground rules and assumptions used for the study are .
delineated and a set of curves is provided which compares the reliabilities of
the two configurations under a number of different conditions. The reliability
block diagram and associated mathematical expressions are discussed. Neither
configuration has a clear-cut advantage with respect to reliability for all
conditions, and the choice of radiator designs depends on the reliabilities of
the HR WaK PMAs and associated equipment as well as on the allowable weight of
the radiator.




NOTE: The information in this document is subject to revision as- analysis
progresses and additional data are acquired.
AEROJET.GENERAL CORPORATION
SUMMARY
This study compares the reliabilities of two alternative radiator subsystems.
The first subsystem consists of two NaK PMAs in a sequentially redundant (one
operating, one standby) configuration, and in series with a single-tube radiator.
The second subsystem consists of a dual-tube radiator and two NaK PMAs and associ-
ated equipment. Each PMA. is connected to one set of tubes, and the PMAs and tubes
are in two independent, sequentially operated, heat rejection loops. The results
indicate that the choice of configurations (with respect to reliability) is a
function of NaK PMA reliability and radiator weight. For total radiator weight
below 2670 pounds, a single-tube radiator is preferred, regardless of PMA relia-
bility. Above 2670 pounds, the choice of radiator configuration depends on the
reliability of the NaK PMA and associated equipment. A set of curves is included,
comparing the reliability of the two configurations with equal weight radiators.
An additional curve indicates the reliability break-even points of single vs.
dual-tube radiators over the range of radiator weights and PMA reliabilities.
DISCUSSION
In order to determine the optimum radiator configuration, the relative relia-
bilities of single and dual-tube radiators must be analytically compared. However,
since the entire heat rejection (HE) loop configuration is affected by the radiator
design, it is necessary to consider the heat rejection loop as a subsystem and to
evaluate the overall reliability'of the loop. This is a function of radiator
weight and the reliability of the NaK PMA and associated equipment. Radiator
weight is used as an independent variable since, given a basic radiator design,
the radiator reliability is a function of armor plate thickness which, in turn,
can be defined in terms of total weight of the radiator.
The subsystem schematic for the two candidate configurations of the HE loop















b. Dual-tube Radiator Subsystems
Figure 1. Reliability Block Diagrams of Heat Rejection Loop
Configuration a..of figure 1 indicates that PMA. operates first with a single-
tube radiator and, in case of failure of the first PMA, the second PMA is started
and uses the same set of radiator tubes. A simple flapper-type valve, with
reliability approaching unity, would be used to prevent a recirculating WaK flow
between the two pumps. This valve and other equipment for failure detection
and electrical switching are assumed to be significantly more reliable than the
PMA and are not shown in the diagram. The single-tube radiator would have
additional armor thickness to compensate for the difference in weight between
single and dual-tube radiators, thereby permitting direct comparisons of sub-
systems with equal weight radiators.
Configuration b. depicts, in-a reliability logic diagram, two independent
loops, each with a pump and radiator. The dual-tube radiator is a single integrated
component containing two separate and independent sets of tubes, one set of tubes
for each PMA. In case of failure of the first'PMA or leakage from the first set
of radiator tubes, the second PMA and second set of tubes are used. There are
no cross connections in the actual system, and no valving is required. Failure
detection and electrical switching equipment are assumed to be highly reliable
and are not shown in the diagram.
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A number of assumptions and criteria were formulated to provide a clear
basis and set of ground rules for the comparison. Some of these have been
indicated above but will be repeated here in more detail. It is important that
these assumptions and their implications be fully understood since changes in the
ground rules could affect the conclusions.
1. Comparisons are made between subsystems with radiators of equal weight.
A single-tube radiator will have sufficient additional armor to com-
pensate for the higher tube, manifold, and fluid inventory weight of a
dual-tube radiator.
2. In a single-tube radiator subsystem, a simple flapper-type check valve
is sufficient to prevent the recirculating flow of NaK between the two
PMA.S.
3. The PMA.-radiator configuration for a dual-tube radiator consists of two
physically independent loops, each with a PMA and one set of radiator
tube s.
k. The PMA.S operate sequentially. One PMA operates until a failure is
incurred; then the second PMA is started. In the single-tube radiator
configuration, the failure is that of the PMA; in the dual-tube con-
figuration, the failure of either the first PMA. or first set of radiator
tubes results in switchover.
5. Failure detection and switching are sufficiently reliable and rapid
such that the switchover to the second PMA can be accomplished without
affecting the performance or reliability of the rest of the system.
6. In the case of the dual-tube configuration, NaK leakage from either set
of tubes (but not both) can be tolerated and does not affect the rest
of the system. As long as one PMA and its associated set of radiator
tubes is intact, heat rejection can be accomplished.
-3 -
7. The PMA.S are not susceptible to failure in their non-operating state.
8. Failure of the radiator is due to meteoroid impingement . The failure
rate while non-operating (in the case of the dual-tube configuration)
is the same as the operating failure rate .
9. Probability of radiator damage and its relationship to armor thickness
is determined from the equation in the 20 August 1965 memorandum by
S. Lieblein of LeRC, based on Whipple's 1963A data.* -•' Radiator design
data are derived from R. Geimer's computer program HAKRAD, dated
1-12-67.**
10. All computations are based on a 1+0,000 hour mission.
11. The weight of armor for a dual-tube radiator is exactly twice that for
a single -tube radiator with equal armor thickness.
The first step in the analysis is to relate armor thickness to reliability
for ^ 0,000 hours. Using Lieblein's equation and Geimer's data, the following
relationships are derived:
T
• • i -L
a) tio,ooo = c7
b) 0^,000 = C -~lnP •
where t = thickness; T^ = time = 10,000 hours; T_ = time? = 40,000 hours;
'£•_'''= probability of no meteroid damage = .90 (= reliability); and C is
a constant which accounts for the geometry, material, meteoroid
velocity, and other factors in Lieblein's equation.
 s
* Memorandum, S. Lieblein to Space Power Systems Division (C. J. Daye),
"Meteoroid Protection Criteria", dated 20 August 1965.
** Memorandum, R. G. Geimer and R. J. Huang, "HRL and LCL Radiator Configuration
for PCS-G", dated 26 January 1967.
Using Geimer's data, t __„ = .162
,-lnP
' -k
where C = C
C =
0.10536 (0.162) o
— = 0.72566UU x 1010,000
-2C = 0.922962 x 10 = 0.00922962
Since T? = Uo,000 hours is a constant,
C x = a constant = 0.130525
Therefore, the equation relating armor thickness to reliability for a
J-t-0,000 hour mission for one set of tubes is:
T =. 0.130525/ (-InR)1/
The. second step in the analysis is to determine armor weight as a function
of thickness. Since weight is directly proportional to cross -section area (for
a given material and design), the cross-section area is determined''.' first, using





— ts= '/4 td
.2-5 O.D.
Figure 2. Cross -section of armor showing tube O.D.
A = (t +• -0.125) (0.25 + 1/2 tj + ~ (0.125 +
A = 0.598175 t 22+>O.Ulo675 t -f'-0. 00670637SL • • SL • *
- 77(0.125)'
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Using Geimer's data and the above equations, a thickness of 0.2.62"
yields a cross-section area of 0.08893^ - sq. in. and an armor weight of U22.9
pounds for a single set of radiator tubes.
By increasing t in small increments, a set of thickness-weight-
a
reliability numbers is obtained for a single set of radiator tubes.
Subsequently, expressions for the reliability of one set of tubes
in a dual radiator and the reliability of a single radiator whose total
weight is equal to the total weight of a dual-tube radiator are
developed. The difference in weight between single and dual-tube
radiators is 372.1 pounds plus the weight of the armor for one set of
tubes. This difference is added to the weight of armor of the single-
tube radiator, and the corresponding thickness and reliability are
calculated.
The appropriate equations have been incorporated into computer
programs and tabulations have been made of armor thickness, reliability
of a single-tube radiator, reliability of each half of a dual-tube




Armor Thickness, Reliability,'and Weight Data
Armor 1+0,000 Hour 1+0,000 Hour
Thickness Total Weight Reliability of Half Reliability of
(inches) (Lbs.)?. of Dual-Tube Radiator Single-Tube Radiator
.321+1+ 1807 .200 .9741
.3364 1853 .300v .9776
.3486 1901 .1+00 .9805
.3618: 1953 .500 .9832
.3776 2017 .600 .9858
.3976 2100 .700 .9884
.4267 2225 .800 .9913
.14-810 2*172 .900 .9914-6
.1+906 2517 .910 .9950
.5000 2562 .920 .995!).
.5120 2620 .930 .9958
.5225 2670 .938 .9961
.5262 2690 .91+0 .9962
.5440 2778 .950 .9967
.5672 2892 .960 .9972
.5971 3054 .970 .9977
.61+1+1+ 3313 .980 . .9983
.7365 3855 .990 .99901
.7515 3914-8 .991 .99909
.7697 1*062 .992 .99917
.7797 4126 .9925 .99921
.7906 1+196 .993 .99926
.815!+ 1+358 .994 • .9993^
.8462 if564 .995 -99943
.8859 4837 .996 .99953
.9405 5227 .997 .99963
.9760 51+89 .9975 .99968
1.0239 5856 .998 .99974
1.1875 7204 .'999 " • .99985
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The reliabilities of heat rejection loop configurations with equal weight
radiators can be computed from appropriate mathematical models developed from
the block diagrams in figure 1. The mathematical model for the reliability
of a single -tube radiator configuration in figure la, with sequential operation
of the PMA.S and no non-operating failure rate is given by equation 1.
]X *Single = e ' 1 + F P m
where F_M. is the PMA failure '-rate for a ^0,000 hour mission; andJrlVlA. '- '
F . is the operating' failure rate for a single -tube radiator
for a ^ 0,000 hour mission.
rF
Note that the general case,
 e , is the expression for the reliability
•
of a single, non-redundant component so that in equation 1, e • •- and
are the expressions for the reliabilities of a single PMA. and a single radiator,
respectively.
The reliability of the dual-tube radiator configuration in figure Ib, with
each PMA and corresponding set of radiator tubes in independent, sequentially-
operated HR loops is given by equation (2).
R = R-"FPMA x '-.~r—^  -! F;PM + FMD> r -F™-" -- -F"—Ik -F— —i*dual re e
~F +  ~~;;PMA RAD
FNON-OP
f -F -F T




where F^ ,.. is again the PMA failure rate for a U0,000 hour mission;
'.rlYlA.
F_flT^ is the operating failure rate for one set of tubes in aixAJJ
dual-tube radiator for a t^-0,000 hour mission; and
_Qp is the sys-l
hour mission.
Fi\rni\r n  ^ s *he svs*em non-operating failure rate for a ij-0,000
This equation is derived from the standard reliability expression for two
sequentially-operated systems with equal operating failure rates and a
non-operating failure rate for the standby system.
- 8 -
Since the non-operating failure rate of the PMA is assumed to be zero
while that of the radiator is equal to its operating failure rate, equation 2
can be changed to:
R -f -1dual . e





Note that, in equation 2a, e^ ' ,<• is again the reliability of one PMA.
7- T? AT)
while
 e- -^ "-^  is the reliability of one set of tubes in a dual-tube1 radiator.
By assuming a particular weight radiator (or its equivalent - 'a
radiator configuration with a specific reliability) and by varying the
reliability of the PMA., the reliabilities of single and dual-tube radiator
systems of equal weight can be compared. System reliability curves have been
plotted for a number of radiator reliabilities from 0.90 to 0.9975- (These
reliabilities refer to one set of tubes in a dual-tube radiator.) System
reliability curves for single-tube radiator systems of equal weight are
plotted on the same graphs - figures 3 through 15. For example, the comparison
of system reliabilities for a dual-tube radiator system with a 0.99 reliabil-
ity for each half and a single-tube radiator system of equal weight is shown in
figure 22.. This figure indicates that, if .the reliability of the NaK PMA.
and associated equipment is less than 0.93? a system with a single-tube
radiator (figure la) is slightly more reliable. For higher NaK PMA reliabil-
ities, a dual-tube radiator system is more reliable, and its advantage
increases significantly as the reliability of the NaK PMA approaches unity.
Note that, for dual-tube radiators with each set of tubes having,':.a
reliability below 0.9^ (total weight less than 26?0 pounds) a single-tube
radiator system provides higher reliability for all values of PMA reliability.
On the other hand, for heavy radiators and high NaK PMA reliabilities,
the dual-tube configuration is preferred. Also, for heavy radiators, there is
essentially no difference in the reliabilities of the two configurations
when the NaK PMA reliability is below 0.95.
A final curve, figure l6, shows the break-even points for reliability
of the two HE loop configurations. For combinations of PMA reliability
and radiator weight which fall on the curve (e.g., RpMA = -968, radiator
weight = 3305^ pounds) the reliabilities of both configurations are the
same (0.9972). For combinations falling below the curve, the single-tube
radiator configuration provides higher reliability; for combinations above
the curve, the dual-tube configuration is more reliable. Figure 16 does
not provide specific system reliability information for combinations not on
this curve. The actual system reliabilities and the differences in reliabil-
ity between the two configurations should be determined from the curves in
figures 3 through 15.
In addition to showing radiator weight on the vertical axis of figure 16,
two additional scales are provided. One scale shows the corresponding reli-
ability of one set of tubes of a dual-tube radiator whose total weight is
given by the weight scale. The second shows the corresponding reliability
of a single-tube radiator of equal total weight.
CONCLUSIONS
For radiator weights below 26?0 pounds, the single-tube configuration is
more reliable. The extent of the advantage depends on actual weight and PMA.
reliability. As radiator weight increases, the dual-tube radiator config-
uration has higher reliability for high PMA. reliabilities (the exaxt break-,
even point varies from about 0.95 to 0.99 PMA, reliability) while there is
some preference for the single -tube radiator below this level. For radiator
weights above kOOO pounds and PMA. reliabilities below 0.95, reliabilities of
the two configurations are essentially the same.
- 10 -
COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE AND DUAL TUBE RADIATORS
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RELIABILITY OF A SINGLE MAK PMA
Figure 3
one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .900
single-tube radiator = .99^6
997 .99^
Weight (pounds) = 2^72
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RELIABILITY OF A SINGLE NAK PMA
Figure h
R
one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .910
TD
single-tube radiator = .9950
Weight (pounds) = 251?
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one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .920
single-tube radiator
Weight (pounds) = 2562
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one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .930
single-tube radiator = .9958
Weight (pounds) = 2620
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RELIABILITY OF A SINGLE MK PMA
Figure 7
one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .
single-tube radiator
Weight (pounds) = 2690
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one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .950
single-tube radiator = .9967
Weight (pounds) = 2778
R
COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE AND DUAL TUBE RADIATORS
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RELIABILITY OF A SINGLE MAK PMA
R
Figure 9
one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .960
Rsingle-tube radiator = .9972
Weight (pounds) = 2892
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one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .970
Rsingle-tube radiator = .9977
Weight (pounds) = 305^
COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE AND DUAL TUBE RADIATORS
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RELIABILITY OF A SINGLE HA.K PMA
Figure 11
one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .980
single^tube radiator = .998
Weight (pounds) = 3313
COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE AND DUAL TUBE RADIATORS
.30 .50 .70 .80 .90 .93 .95 .97 .98 " .99 .993 ,995 .997 .998 .999
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Figure 12
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COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE AND DUAL TUBE RADIATORS
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RELIABILITY OF A SINGLE
Figure 13
'.!. !..:.














• • 'H: .











1- i :' !
:. M •
1 i ' i
5 • • :•
j "" '
trtt.
I ; ; ;

























































• ; ! ' i




















i l l !j ' .
ii!
|H
•i T :- {-
. . j —
! T-T.
r ;-1 :• - : i - ; - -;i: :• " ii
i ; 1
 • r i-"
- . ' - ' . . ; . : •
. j ,— -\
kTIjJBE^
&E-[SU]
• 1 1 1 1 ; •
• i i |
• i : i 'i
' - : : T J
:
 - 1 : 1 ' |
;
: i i '
1 ;
 i
' ' ; i i ii - ' • :
. , j . t [ ;
!'J: ;!'
• ' ! I
i . ; !
| ! ; : :
I • ' ! '
1
 l i '
' ' ' • t
l \ \ -:
 i * i i
' : t :










•'• ' ' ) i
; • J
i-' : ' ; ' '
3SYSTEM ;
s i • ! it- : . , r -
M : . ' j - '_
: ' * .
i '1 j - ; '___
: : ^ \-^
; . . , ^..
i : " i \-
i • ; . •
J ; '
i ' ; ^
, : • ;
i , . 77
: : ; • ?
i '• ; •• i -
• , , t--
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MAK PMA
R
one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .995
Rsingle-tube radiator = .999^3
Weight (pounds)
COMPARISON OF RELIABILITIES OF SINGLE AND DUAL TUBE RADIATORS
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one set of tubes, dual-tube radiator = .9975
single-tube radiator = .99968
Weight (pounds) = 5)489
BREAK EVEN CURVE FOR RELIABILITY OF SINGLE-TUBE VS1. DUAL-TUBE RADIATOR SUBSYSTEM
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RELIABILITY OF SINGLE NAK PMA AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS
Figure 16
-9999
B. OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF LAYOUT
1. Component Arrangement
Figure IIB1-1, Sheet 1, presents the overall PCS component
arrangement for the dual PCS configuration concept. The conceptual layout
includes the components and piping for redundant mercury and heat rejection
loops and the electrical subsystem. The Intermediate Loop has redundant com-
ponents. The PCS delivered to the NASA Space Power Facility (Plum Brook Station,
Sandusky, Ohio) will contain single mercury and heat rejection loops and "one
electrical subsystem. The Intermediate Loop will be fabricated with redundant
components. The conceptual layout has been prepared with redundant system
layouts for the following reasons: (l) in order to demonstrate that the PCS
envelope selected can include a fully redundant PCS, and (2) to provide infor-
mation concerning the regions which are available for electrical and instru-
mentation harness and Lubricant/Coolant Loop routing without interfering with
components and piping.
The current component configurations were presented on the PCS
layout where possible; thus, there will be no change in the envelope of the
following components: alternator, NaK Pump Motor Assembly, Mercury Pump Motor
Assembly, and Parasitic Load Resistor. Minor changes are expected for the con-
deriser, turbine assembly, and mercury flow control valve. These changes do not
greatly modify the current envelopes for these components, and they were shown
on the layout as they are presently designed. For example, the condenser NaK
side connections have been changed to 3 inches O.D. tubing and can withstand
higher piping loads than previously. The boiler configuration has been changed
from a helical coil (5^ ,25-inch mean diameter, 5-incli shell O.D., 6-lnch pitch)
to a planar configuration. Figure IIB1-2 describes boiler configuration con-
ceptual designs. For the Combined System Test, the second boiler will be asso-
ciated with the operating PCS. The reservoir envelopes are based on the current
specification, AGC-10623; a final revision will be made for these reservoirs
II B 1
following approval of the conceptual design layouts. Some increase in reservoir
inventory is.anticipated, due to the fact that the system piping, is larger in
diameter than the piping which partially influenced the original reservoir re-
quirements; this piping was 2-2-g- inches in diameter as opposed to the current
3-inch size. Also, the current boiler has about twice the previous boiler's NaK
inventory (—200 pounds versus --'100 pounds); there is room on the layout for
increased reservoir length to compensate for the increased loop inventories. The
HRL Flow Control Valve and Mercury Injection Reservoir configurations are based
upon.previous conceptual designs for these components prepared to the prior Part
I specifications for these components. The electrical equipment housings have been
modified for .the new PCS envelope and will be discussed in the next section.
The TM and condenser are close-coupled in order to minimize the
pressure loss between the TA exhaust and condenser since the net system electrical
power output is decreased by about 1 Kwe for every 1 psia of pressure increase in
TA back pressure. The TAA is oriented horizontally since it has been designed for
operation and tested in this position. Similarly, the condenser operates with its
longitudinal axis within 5 degrees of the environmental gravity vector. Note that
the section width is established by the sum of the widths of the two TAAs and
associated support'structure.
The reservoirs (Heat Rejection and Intermediate Loops) are located
between the b6ilers in order to minimize the overall section width. The reser-
voirs are oriented so that the fluid inventory does not place a side load on the
bellows; i.e., the centerline of the bellows is parallel to the local gravity
vector.
The L/C loop components are located near the components that are
serviced by the Lube/Coolant circuit (Mercury Pump Motor Assembly, Turbine Alter-
nator Assembly, Mercury Injection system, and Electrical System). This should
II B 2
result in minimum L/C piping. Note that the NaK Pump Motor Assemblies will be
NaK-cooled in the PCS.
The Mercury Pump Motor Assembly is located below the condenser
to eliminate pump NPSH problems during ground test. The mercury pump should be
located so that the suction pressure does not exceed /».UO psia which is the pump
visco seal limit. The mercury injection reservoir is located adjacent to the
condenser to help eliminate gravity effects in mercury loop inventory control;
i.e., the reservoir pressure would equal the state-point condensing pressure.
The reservoir is oriented with the bellows center line parallel to the local
gravity vector to eliminate side Loads on the bellows convolutions due to the
reservoir inventory during normal system operation.
The condenser mercury discharge valve is located close to the
condenser so that the line between the condenser and mercury pump motor assembly
is filled from the reservoir and does not have to be filled by condensing mercury
oh startup.
The boiler mercury outlet is located as close to the TAA inlet as
possible in order to minimize stresses in the mercury vapor line due to thermal
expansion of the line.
The electrical components are located as far from the nuclear
radiation source as possible, and can be readily isolated from the higher tempera-
ture loop components and piping.
The NaK Pump Motor Assemblies are oriented horizontally since the
NaK Motor Assembly has been designed for operation and tested in this position.
The discharge connection is outboard of the PCS section in order to improve
access for pump installation, removal, and replacement.
2. Piping Arrangement
The PCS piping configuration is based upon the system schematic
in Figure IIA1-1. The piping configuration for a dual PCS is shown in Figure
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IIB1, Sheet 2. The main flow piping in the Intermediate and Heat Rejection Loops
is 3 inches O.D. x 0.083 inch wall, 3l6 stainless steel, with the exception of
the piping near the NaK Pump Motor Assemblies. The NpJC Pump Motor Assemblies
have 2 inches O.D. x 0.065 inch wall suction and discharge connections, and these
will not be changed for the Combined System Test PCS. The Heat Rejection Loop
piping, to and from the facility heat sink, will be anchored at the frame inter-
facfe for several reasons: first, this will de-couple the Heat Rejection Loop
t
piping from the facility piping which is an advantage since greater facility
piping loads can be imposed upon the frame than upon the PCS components (which
would be the case if the facility piping were directly coupled to the PCS piping);
secondly, as a consequence of the above, the pressure losses in the lines to the
Heat Rejection Loop heat sink can be decreased by using larger diameter piping
than the PCS piping. The Lubricant/Cooling piping will also be anchored at the
PCS structure periphery. The piping to the Reactor Primary Loop will also be
anchored to de-couple the PCS from the RPL.
The lubricant/cooling loop piping will be added, following
approval of the PCS conceptual design. It consists of low temperature, small
diameter tubing, and it is not expected to be a problem in routing.
3. Electrical Subassembly Description
The electrical subassemblies are shown in Figure IIB3-1. The
location of individual modules are presented on Figure IIB3-2. The LTEA-1 is
required to provide power to the redundant RPL EM Pump. This configuration
reflects the following ground rules:
(a) Start programmer elements are not part of the electrical
t
assemblies, but will be located in the control room during the PCS/CST.
(b) Electromagnetic Interference filters will not be included
in the electrical assemblies for the PCS, but there is some space available for
these in the High Temperature Electrical Assembly.
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(c) Space for static inverters (for rotating and. electromagnetic
pumps) has been provided in the assemblies.
(d) Low Temperature Electrical Assembly 1A contains existing
(developed) electrical modules, LTEA IB contains new electrical modules, and
HTEA contains existing (developed) electrical modules.
(e) The assemblies consist of a cold plate with a vented protective
cover fastened to the base plate.
(f) In order to remove and replace modules, the protective cover
would be removed from the top.
Figure IIB3-3 describes the overall guidelines which will govern
the harness design. Finally, the Figure IIB3-4 presents the electrical system
schematic.
k. Interface Locations
PCS facility mechanical interfaces will be located at the front
face of the PCS to simplify mating with SPF TSE. The regions of the PCS which
have been assigned for mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation interfaces
are shown on Figure IIB^ -l. The mechanical and electrical interfaces are itemized
in Figures IIB^ -2 and IIB^ -3- The instrumentation channel requirements are listed
in Figure IIF2.
5« Component List
The major components required for assembly of a CST/PCS are listed
in Figure IIB5. Government Furnished Equipment is distinguished from Aerojet
Nuclear System Company delivered components.
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TM 7993:70-628
THIS DRAWING SHOWS THE COMPONENT AND PIPING ARRANGEMENT
REQUIRED TO SATISFY Tt€ PCS SECTION, SEPARATED BY DASHED
LINES, 1H THE SCHEMATIC BELOW (BASED ON ENGINEERING flESIGN
FILE HO. SA004? DATED 4/21/70).
THE GENERAL OVERALL SIZE AND COMPONENT ARRANGEMENT IS BASED
ON A QUARTER SCALE MOCKUP BUILT BY NASA PERSONNEL AT THE
LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER, CLEVELAND. OHIO.
THE COMPONENT ENVELOPE SIZES SHOWN ARE THE PRESENT SNAP-8
DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING;
A. BOILER
THE BOILER SHELL IS 7.50 O D « Z 3 FT. !0 IN. LONG
CIRCUMFERENCE OF BOTH 180° TURNS:
DIA • 45.00
C - 3.14 * 15.00
C- Ml, 3 OR II FT. 9,3 IM
DISTANCE FROM UPPER END OF BOILER TO START Of UPPER
180° TURN -66.50
DISTANCE BETWEEN UPPER AND LOWER 1300 TURN . 29.75
DISTANCE FROM LOWER END OF BOILER TO START OF LOWER
180°TURN-48.45





286.00 OR 23 FT, 10 IN.
6. EXPANSION RESERVOIRS (SPEC, AGC-10W3 ENVELOPES!
ILR - 2100 DIA 133.00 LC, (FORMER PNL RESERVOIR ENVROPf)
LCR-16.OODIAi24.OOLG.
HRR- lg.OODIAx40.OOLG.
BOILER STATIC KaK RESERVOIR • 7.80 01A > 18.00 LG
C. ELECTRICAL CONTROL PACKAGES • THE CONFIGURATIONS SHOWN
ARE BASED ON PRELIMINARY PACKAGING CONCEPTS CONTAINED
IN ENCLOSURE (1) OF LETTER NO. 7997:70:0013. DATED 7 MAY 1970, .
FROMS L BRAOLEYTQA.W NICE.
D. NUCLEAR SYSTEM ELECTRICAL CONTROLS - THE PACKAGE ENVELOPE
IS BASED ON AREA REQUIRED FOR CONTROLS SUPPLIED BY A. I.
12.0CU. FT. I.
L MERCURY INJECTION RESERVOIR - THE CONFIGURATION IS
BASED ON A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN BY METAL BELLOWS CORP.
IDWG. 59567!.




DISTANCE FROM TOP OF FRAME PROVIDES CLEARANCE FOR
ELECTRICAL TERMINALS. DISTANCE FROM END OF FRAME
PROVIDES CLEARANCE FOR L'C TUBING AND ELECTRICAL
CONNECTOR. WIDTH OF TAA AND MOUNTS ESTABLISHED
30.DO-INCH WIDE FRAME FOR EACH TAA MAKING THE PCS
SECTION 60.00 INCHES WIDE.
B. BOILER
BOILERS ARE LOCATED ASJ.OW AS POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE
DRAINAGE FROM THE HG VAPOR LINE INTOTHETAA. THEY
ARE LOCATED ON THE OUTER FRAME STRUCTURE TO CLEAR
THE HR AN IL RESERVOIRS AND PMA'S. THE HG VAPOR OUT
INTERFACE IS POSITIONED NEAR THE TAA TO MINIMIZE •
STRESSES IN THE HG VAPOR LINE.
C. HRR'S, ILR
THESE RESERVOIRS ARE CENTERED BETWEEN VERTICAL FRAME
. MEMBERS. THIS PROVIDES fOS SUPPORT AT THEIR C.G.
THE IL AND HR PMA'S ARE CANT (LEVERED OFF THE SAW VERTICAL
FRAME MEMBERS. THE RESERVOIRS ARE LOCATED 6.00 INCHES
FROM. THE TOP OF THE FRAME TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO PRESSURE
AND VENT CONNECTIONS. LOCATING THEM HIGH IN THE ASSEMBLY
PROVIDE AREA FOR FLEXIBILITY LOOPS AND DRAINAGE.
D. HR AN IL PMA'S
THE ELEVATION SELECTED WAS TO PROVIDE ACCESS BETWEEN
THE BOILER, AREA BELOW FOR TUBING AND DI VERIER VALVES
AND DRAINAGE. THEY ARE PLACED NEAR THE CENTER FRAME
AND ORIENTED SO THAT PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHARGE LINES
ARE ACCESSABLE FOR OUTS IDE THE FRAME.
L MIR'S AND HG PMA'S
THESE COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED NEAR THE HC OUT CONDENSER
INTERFACE TO MINIMIZE TUBING LENGTHS IN THE HG, AND
THEREFORE, PRESSURE LOSS IN THE PUMP SECTION LINE.
F. HTEA;S AND LTEA'S
THESE UNITS ARE LOCATED ON THE TOP OF THE FRAME WHERE
THEY CAN BE THERMALLY INSULATED FROM THE PCS. ELECTRICAL
HARNESS ROUTING CAN BE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED WITH THESE
UNITS LOCATED TOGETHER AND AI THE TOP. THEY ARE LOCATED
AS REMOTELY FROM THE RADIATION SOURCE AS POSSIBLE.
G. UC PMA'S
THE L/C PMA'S ARE LOCATED TO PROVIDE SIMPLE TUBE ROUTING
TO COMPONENTS IN THE L/C SYSTEM. THEY ARE ALSO LOCATED
IN THE LOWEST TEMPERATURE AREA.
H. BOILEREXPANSION RESERVOIRS
THESE RESERVOIRS ARE LOCATED NEAR THE ENDS Of THf BOILERS
WHERE THE STATIC NaK CONNECTION WILL BE LOCATED.
5 STRUCTURAL PHILOSOPHY
THE CENTER FRAME STRUCTURE IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY STflUCTURE
SINCE IT SUPPORTS COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY. MOST OF THE COMPONENTS.
THE SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS THE STRUCTURE FORMING THE OUTER
tNVELOPt OF Otf PCS. THE TAA'S, HTEA'S, AND LTEA'S ARE PARTIALLY
SUPPORTED AND THE BOILERS COMPLETELY SUPPORTED BY THIS STRUCTURE.
6, THE L/C PIPING ILAND HR PMA'S RECIRCULATION SYSTEMS AND
ASSOCIATED PIPING AND ELECTRICAL AND 1NSTRUWNTATION HARNESS
ARE NOT SHOWN ON THIS LAYOUT.
7. THEFOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OFTHETUB1NG SHOWNON SHEET2. .




1.00 O.D. x.065 WALL
2 500.0. *. 120 WALL
LOO 0.0. x.065WALL
0 750.D. x.083WALL
0.50 O.D. x.065 WALL
MA IN FLOW LINES





CONDENSER TO JET PUMP LINES
JET PUMP TO HcPMA LINES
HGPMA TO BOILER LINES
:TOP
VIEW BE.LOW SECTION i<vA, CUTTIN& PLANE MOT SHOWN
«DCT«SS, I uSjBQT





LOCATED AT TOP OF UNIT,
PESISM LAYOUT..PCS'-SI70143 1268337
TM 7993:70-628
THIS DRAWING SHOWS THE COMPONENT AND PIPING ARRANGEMENT
REQUIRED TO SATISFY THE PCS SECTION, SEPARATED BY DASHED
LINES, IN THE SCHEMATIC BELOW (BASED ON ENGINEERING DESIGN
FILE NO. SAOM2 DATED 4121/70).
TW CENERAl CVERAU. SIZE AND COMPONENT ARRANGEMENT IS BASED
ON A QUARTER SCALE MOCKUP BUILT BY NASA PERSONNEL AT THE
LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER, CLEVELAND-OHIO.
THE COMPONENT ENVELOPE SIZES SHOWN ARE THE PRESENT SNAP-8
DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING:
A. BOILER
THE BOILER SHELL IS 7.50 ODx 23 FT. 10 IN. LONG
CIRCUMRRENCE OF BOTH 180° TURNS:
DIA-45.00
C-3.14x45.00
C- 141.3 OR II FT. 9.3 IN.
DISTANCE FROM UPPER END OF BOILER TO START OF UPPER
180° TURN -66.50
DISTANCE BETWEEN UPPER AND LOWER 180° TURN • 29.75
DISTANCE FBOM LOWER END OF BOILEH TO START OF LOWEH
180° TURN-48.45





286.00 OR 23 FT, 10 IN.
B. EXPANSION RESERVOIRS (SPEC. AGC-10623 ENVELOPES)
ILR -22.00DIAX 33.DOLG. (FORMER PNL RESERVOIR ENVELOPE)
LCR-16.OODIAt24.OOLG.
HRR-18.OODIAx40.OOLG. '
BOILER STATIC NaK RESERVOIR - 7.80 OIA x18.00 LC.
C. ELECTRICAL CONTROL PACKAGES - THE CONFIGURATIONS SHOWN
ARE BASED ON PRELIMINARY PACKAGING CONCEPTS CONTAINED
IN ENCLOSURE (1) OF LETTER NO. 7997-70:0013, DATED 7 MAY 1970
FROMS. L BRADLEY TO A. W. NICE.
0. NUCLEAR SYSTEM ELECTHICAL CONTROLS - THE PACKAGE ENVaOPt
IS BASED ON AREA REQUIRED FOR CONTROLS SUPPLIED BY A. I.
I2.0CU, FT. I.
E MERCURY INJECTION RESERVOIR - THE CONFIGURATION IS
BASED ON A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN BY METAL BELLOWS CORP.
(OWC. S9567).




DISTANCE FROM TOP OF FRAME PROVIDES CLEARANCE FOR
ELECTRICAL TERMINALS. DISTANCE FROM END OF FRAME
PROVIDES CLEARANCE FOB uc TUBINC ANDEIECTHJCAL
CONNECTOR. WIDTH OF TAA AND MOUNTS ESTABLISHED
30.00-INCH WIDE FRAME FOR EACH TAA MAKING THE PCS
SECTION 60.00 INCHES WIDE,
B. BOILER
BOILERS ARE LOCATED AS LOW hS POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE
DRAINAGE FROM THE HG VAPOR LINE INTOTHETAA. THEY
AW LOCATED ON THE OUTER FRAME STRUCTURE TO CLHH
THE HR AN IL RESERVOIRS AND PMA'S. THE HG VAPOR OUT
INTERFACE IS POSITIONED NEAR THE TAA TO MINIMIZE •
STRESSES IN THE HG VAPOR LINE.
C. HHR'S, ILR
THESE RESERVOIRS ARE CENTERED BETWEEN VERTICAL FRAME
. MEMBERS. THISPROVIDESFORSUPPQKTATTHE1RC.G.
THE IL ANO HR PtoA'S hRE CANHLEVERED OFT THE SAW VERTltAV
FRAME MEMBERS. THE RESERVOIRS ARE LOCATED 6,00 INCHES
FROM THE TOP OF THE FRAME TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO PRESSURE
AND VENT CONNECTIONS. LOCATING THEM HIGH IN THE ASSEMBLY
PROVIDE AREA FOR FLEXIBILITY LOOPS AND DRAINAGE.
D. HR AN IL PMA'S
THE ELEVATION SELECTED WAS TO PROVIDE ACCESS BETWEEN
THE BOILER AREA BaOW FOR TUBING AND DIVERTER VALVES
ANODRAINAGE. THEVARE FtACEDWAR THE CENTER FRAME
tm ORIENTED SO THAT PUMP SUCTION ftNB DISCHARGE LINES
ARE ACCESSIBLE FOR OUTS IDE THE FRAME.
L MIR'S AND HG PMA'S
THESE COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED NEAR THE HQ OUT CONDENSER
INTERFACE TO MINIMIZE TUBING LENGTHS IN THE HG, AND
THEREFORE, PRESSURE LOSS IN THE PUMP SECTION LINE.
f. HIEA'S AND LTEA'S
THESE UNITS ARE LOCATED ON THE TOP Of THE FRAME WHERE
THEY CAN BE THERMALLY INSULATED FROM THE PCS. ELECTRICAL
HARNESS ROUTING CAN BE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED WITH THESE
UN ITS LOCATED TOGETHER AND AT THE TOP. THEY ARE LOCATED
AS REMOTELY FROM THE RADIATION SOURCE AS POSSIBLE.
G L/C PMA'S
THE L/C PMA'S ARE LOCATED TO PROVIDf SIMPLE TUBE ROUTING
TO COMPONENTS IN THE L/C SYSTEM. THEY ARE ALSO LOCATED
IN THE LOWEST TEMPERATURE AREA.
H. BOILEREXPANSION RESERVOIRS
THESE RESERVOIRS ARE LOCATED NEAR THE ENDS OF THE BOILERS
WHERE THE STATIC NaK CONWCTION WILL BE LOCATED.
5 STRUCTURAL PHILOSOPHY
THE CENTER FRAME STRUCTURE IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY STRUCTURE
SINCE IT SUPPORTS COMPLETELY, OR PARTIALLY, MOST OF THE COMPONENTS.
THE SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS THE STRUCTURE FORMING THE OUTER
ENVELOPE OF THE PCS THE TAA'S, HTEA'S, AND LTEA'S ARE PARTIALLY
SUPPORTED AND THE BOILERS COMPLETELY SUPPORTED BY THIS STRUCTURE.
6. THE UC PIPING, IL AND HR PMA'S RECIRCULATlON SYSTEMS AND
ASSOCIATED PIPING AND ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION HARNESS
ARE NOT SHOWN ON THIS LAYOUT.
7 THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE TUBING SHOWN ON SHEET 2. .
MATERIAL TYPE 316 CRES
3.000,0. x.083WALL
2.00 O.D. x.065 WALL
I.» 0. D. x . 065 WALL
1.00 0.0. K. 065 WALL
2.MQ.Q. x.UOmL









CONDENSER TO JET PUMP LINES
JET PUMP TO HG PMA LINES
HG PMA TO BOILER LINES
SECTIONJ A c
TOP
view ECLOW SG^TIOW A-A GUTTIN& PLANE NOT SHOWN
j£
tBTO Ucf.WlfiU£V
' HOOK «™m im /;
^SuWjil
PCS SECTIOW W/HTEA/'LT&




Interoffice Memo 27 May 1970
7973: 70:0007: AJS; ESC :mr,3
TO: Distribution
FROM; E.S.Chalpin/A.J. Sellers
SUBJECT; SNAP-8 13 Tube Boiler (BRDC
State Point Conditions
Designs for Revised System
DI STRIBUTION : W . P . Banks , R . Ches worth , H . Derov , C . Hawk , J . Hodgs on , A .. Kreeger ,
G-Loribard, L.Lopez, U.A.Pineda, R.W.Marshall, Jr., ..jL.Bre'Jndel-,, File 797.'!
ENCLOSURES: Table I -SNAP-8 PCS-G BRDC #5, Boiler Design Specifications
and Operating Parameters
Fig. 1 - • SNAP-8, PCS-G BRDC #5,
 ;BODEPE Temperature and Pressure ProfrUes
2 /;-.13:Tobe Dbutile-rCcJntainment Array
3 - through 8 - Boiler Geometries
BEFERENCSS; (l) "BODEPE - IBM ,-}60 Homuiter Code for S1M.P-8 Boiler Heat and
Momentum Transfer Analysis," TM ^92 1:68 -551, Octo 1968,
12) "PCS-G S-iete Point Conditions - Revision Eate 4/21/70»'f
EBF Serial N-SAOOl**
This memo presents the summary of the bare refractory double contained
13 tube boiler design analysis. Per NASA-LeRC direction (£-19-70), the mercury
flow containment in the oval/round S'3-Ta tube assembly with a multipassage plug
insert (MPP) and swirl wire (SW) internal geometry was assuraed to be identic&l tt>
that of BRDC #1*. To eeet the revised PCS-G state point conditions (Reference 2)
the tube count vas increased frcro 7 to 13 « Lower boiler operating pressure level
acd pressure drop, and increased mercury flow rate were reasons for the increase
is the tube count.
Relatively good agreei.ient between the UODEPE code design predict ions *».
t:>e test results of the SB-2, SF-lA fcnd BRDC #* boilers ie the basis for the new
ioller design approach. The heat ejic momentum transfer correlations use 2 in
•4:sa lysis are thc«e established frou the wetting and non-wetting two-phase flow
in a helical flow pasFage (Reference 1).
The summary of the thermal design analysis is presented in Table I. It
specifies the assumed boiler crcuss section geometry and the calculated boiler MP?
aad total length requirements for lev- NaK inlet temperature schedule as well as
the boiler operating thermal end dynemic parameters for tbe prescribed F'^S-O
systems state point conditions - Figure 2 shows the graph! ce,l interpretatict of
tae predicted boiler performance characteristics at low and high NaK inlet
temperatures « The boiler cross section geometry and the proposed boile? overall
configurations are depicted in Fi-~urc,' 2 and Figures 3 through 7 respectively..
Figure II B 1-?.
12 pages
Distribution. -2- ' 7973; 70
Figure 8 depicts a 19 tube, bimetal boiler with a single -flute? helix replacing
the swirl wire as an example of a different approach to boiler design*
P:' gures . 3 through 7 list sons advantages and disadvantages of e&ch
design.. The boiler shown i:i Figure -3 is the most preferred frco a boiler design
point because of its vertical mercury inlet. The other designs (Figure* k throjgh
7) are shown in descending order of preference.
Figure 2 shows a typical 13 tube array. The major axis of the static
tTaK tubes will vary depande-vt on the boiler configurations as show ID Figures; 3
through 7« The NaK shell tifce caa be 7.5 "0-D. or 8-0" O.D., depeodeBt on the
boiler confTguration. The reason for this is that Ladish 2.80 turns ai« standard
*t 8.0!; O.D.
. S. Cha^in Head
St&tic





Figure II B 1-2
12 pages
,7??3:7Q:OC-'J7
/.- • ' • • ' • . " , . ; ' TABLE I • • , " - " , .;/.': ; ;
: SRAP-8 PCS-G BRDC No. 5;,




Nxanber of HG Tubes





MPP Flow Pass. Pitch;




boiling and superheat -
Parallel coianterflcw ItoK-To-HG heat
exchanger
Parellel tube Baadle-In-Tube
tr In round. TA tube contained Lc oval ;
V tube with 8i*,gmnt BfeK in ttmralaj? ei
.750" OD x
.88o"/l'265" x .C&9" wall
2o2i> Ftc Tantalum
.06s" Dia. x 2" Pitch. 90# la-
" OD x .120" Wall, 316SS
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1&K Flow Rate * ' " Wr
e '
NaK Inlet Tei{ips. , f^)i
(
 •» .
WWC Itempo Drop * "* AT^^
i" *
' f
NaK Pressure Drop ?„
HG |>l<jw Itete X » , W__,
* . P*^7
rtG Exit Pressure P._ ^HOG
HH Exit Temp. ^
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 TBbo
HG Tnlet Tfemp. •< T—
 1HO 31
HG l^por Beglon Pres« Drop ' ^ 1^10
HG 71 ow Itefttr«Prea « Ifrop
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 & PRf •> -*
HG Inlet, Pressure* -1 P_i t-
Knott Point Tteap^ B5:ff * " AT
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Terulisal ttoK-To-Hp T A^V
\ w * '
'Viapor Superbeat
 v ) , AT_-J
Mean Preheat Flux 9 "__( Hij. _^
Jfean MPP Boiling Flux <r ^"MPJ
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.See Figure. 2 '
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338«- Mean Superheat Flux
19, Boiling Termination Point
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1. Vtrtica! mercury inlet ensures
even fl w distribution to all 13
tubes in a gravity field. Nc
circumferential thermal gradient.
2. Overall length of 23 ft. will fit
in PCS-G package.
3. 180° and 90' turns are standard
Ladish it.ms.
DISADVANTAGES
1. Removal of reservoirs an"1
NPMA's from PCS-G is more
difficult.
2. Static NaK tubes must go from oval
in turns to r.unc! in straight
<:ectioni to facilitate fabrication.
3. Slight difference in mercury tube
lengths due 1o odd number of bsnds




I. L€N<$Tht BETWEEN UAK IH
FT. =













FIGURE 4 BOILER GEOMETRIES
ADVANTAGES
1. 45° mercury inlet allows better
distribution of mercury to all
13 tubes than horizontal Snlei
in a giavity field.
2. Overall length of 23ft. will fi:
in PCS-G package.
3. Uppsr lo.p radius of 22.5 inches
allows f:r reservoir an-J NPMA
r moval from PCS-G.
DISADVANTAGES
1. Static NaK tubes must go from
.val in turns to round jn
straight :ections tc facilitate
fabrication.
2. Complexity cf mercu ry tube
bending is increased due to
chances in bend radii.
3. Slight difference in mercury
tube lengths due to.odd
number cf bend: assuming
tubei are not en led.
1.55- -O.C49
0.7
/. LEV$TH £ETW€EJ(/Nfi.K /t-J f MAK OUT
/s ec.srr. --^46.o/v.





1. Overall length of 23 ft will
fit in PCS-G package.
2. Reservoir and NPMA removal
from PCS-G is possible.
3. Even number of turns results





1. Horizontal mercury inlet will
result in uneven flow
distribution of rre rcury to all
13 tubes in a gravity field. A
circumferential thermal gradient
can result at the me rcury inlet
2. Static NaK tubes must go from
oval in the turns to round in
the straight sections to
facilitate fabrication.
OUT/. LENGTH &£TW£€fJ MAX IM t
is zo.s rr. -24&.Q /*.
Z, SHELL 5/Zf /5 7.5O/H. OD X./2O M WALL.
3. NUMBER or TifB£.S =13.




1. Method of fabrication har been
used successfully in BRDC
boilers II, 2, 3&4 .
2. Boiler will fit in PCS-G package
with greater accessibility to
other components.
DISADVANTAGES
1. Installathnof b.ilers in PCS-G
more difficult. Reservoirs must
be repcsitioned.
2. Slight difference in mercury tube
lengths assuming tubes are not
twisted.
3. Nearly horizontal mercury inlet
will result in uneven fl w distribution
of meiciny to all 13 tubes in a
gravity field. A circumferential
fre rmal g, adient can result at the
mercury inlet.
4. Boilers must be stacked one on top
cf the otte r.
/VAAC IN t A/AK OUTI. LCNGTH
/s 20.5 rr. =
SHZLL Size is 7-fo /n OD x ./2O
3. NutA&e.*. OF TUBE s - /3.
WALL







2. Reservoirs and NPMA's can
be easily removed from PCS-G.
DISADVANTAGES
1. Static NaK oval must be
large to compensate for
differential expansion
between stainless steel and
tantalum.
2. Difficulty in fitting this
configuration into PCS-G
package.
3. Horizontal mercury inlet
will result in uneven
flow distribution of mercury
to all 13 tubes in a gravity
field. A circumferential
thermal gradient can result
at the mercury inlet.
4. Large difference in mercu ry
tube lengths due to odd
number of bends assuming
tubes are not coiled.
/. LENGTH &CTWCZH NAK IN i A/AK OUT
/s zo.s rr * 24&.o/N.
Z. SHZLL SIZC /S 8.3O/// O£> X•. J2C M WALL











1. Boiler will take up
the least amount of
space in comparison
to boilers shown in
Figures 3 through 7.
2. One header only
required for each end
of boiler.
3. N: t'anriticn joints
required.





steel is not a problem.
5. Can be mounts
vertically thus ensur-
ing even distribu-
tion of mercury to
all 13 tubes in a
yra^i ty f.eld.




static NaK tubes would
require two readers
for each end of boiler
thus increasing
complexity.
2. Mercury tubes would
increase from 13 to 19.
3. No extensive test history
fc; full scale boiler of
this des;qn (bimetal
mercury tubes and single
fluted helix).




tS = /9 . .
7. CO JH OD X , I2O W/UL.
3fG SS WAL L = .055" Iff.
TANTA.LUM WALL * . O2C
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ELECTRICAL HARNESS DESIGN CONCEPTS
ROUTING WILL BE DETERMINED ON FULL SCALE MOCKUP
CONDUCTORS WILL BE WELDED TO TERMINALS
HARNESS CABLE TO BE ROUTED IN BUNDLES AND CLAMPED
TO NON-REMOVABLE STRUCTURE
CONDUCTOR INSULATION DESIGNED FOR VACUUM ENVIRONMENT
FIGUREIIB-3-3






C S T / P C S ELECTRICAL SYSTEM D I A G R A M
FIGUREMB-3-4












SNAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
FIGURE



































STRUCTURE: PCS BASE BOLTED TO RPL STRUCTURE AT 12 EXTERIOR COLUMNS,
FIGURENB-4-2




EM PIMP HARNESS (2 Pumps with 2 Stators each) 12
REACTOR COHTROL DRUM MOTORS 20
: 32 ".
PROGRAMMER (CONTROL ROOM) TO PCS
MOTOR CONTRACTOR (k) 2
DC BIAS SPEED CONTROL (5) 2
SIGNAL TO CONTROL VEHICftL MAD BREAKER 2
2NVERTER HIGH/LOW TAP ' <*
5 EHVERTER TO TEMP (4), PMA. (l) DC COETRACTORS 2O
5 L/C ON-OFF SOLo VALUES 15
5 MIS " " " " 15
HO FC VALVE 3
HR FC VALVE 3
DC POWER SUPPLY TO I1WEHTERS 10
LCH POWER 2
FREQUENCY SET POINT 2
VOLTAGE " " 2
ALTERNATOR FLASHING CURRENT 2
6U
PCS TO VEHICLE LOAD










PUMP MOTOR ASSEMBLY, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
PIMP MOTOR ASSEMBLY, INTERMEDIATE LOOP
PUMP MOTOR ASSEMBLY, MERCURY LOOP
PUMP MOTOR ASSEMBLY, L/C LOOP
* RESERVOIR, EXPANSION, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
* RESERVOIR, EXPANSION, INTERMEDIATE LOOP
» RESERVOIR, EXPANSION, BOILER STATIC NaK
* RESERVOIR, EXPANSION, L/C LOOP
RESERVOIR, MERCURY INJECTION
* VALVE, NaK DXVERTER, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
* VALVE, NaK DIVERTER, INTERMEDIATE LOOP
VALVE, FLOW CONTROL, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
VALVE, PLOW CONTROL, MERCURY LOOP
VALVE, SHUT OFF, MERCURY LOOP
VALVE, SHUT OFF, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
VALVE, SHUT OFF, L/C LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER and COLD TRAP, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
PUMP MOTOR ASSEMBLY
HEAT EXCHANGER and COLD TRAP, INTERMEDIATE LOOP
PUMP MOTOR ASSEMBLY
* HIGH TEMPERATURE ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLY NO. 2































* GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
FIGURE II B 5-1
Rage 1 of 2
CST/PCS P.JUS L38T (continued)
ITEM
* LOW TEMPERATURE ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLY NO. 2A
VOIffiAOE REGULATOR
SPEED CONTROL
POWER FACTOR COERBCTIQN ASSEMBLY
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
* LOW TEMPERATURE ELECTRIC. \L ASSEMBLY NO. 2B
* INVERTER, EM PUMP
" INVERTER, NaK PUMP MOTOR -ASSEMBLIES ;
* TRANSFORMER - RECTIFIER "'
CONTACTOR - ±HVfiKXfiK DC •
CONTACTOR - MOTOR TRANSFER
* LOW TEMPERATURE ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLY IB
* CONTACTOR - INVKKEblK DC
* 1NVKKTER, EM PUMP
ELECTRJE^ vL HARNESS
* ELECTRICAL CONTROLS ASSEMBLY, NUCLEAR SYSTEM
FLOWMETER, EM, ilOTERMEDIATE LOOP
FLOWMETER, MERCURY LOOP
FLOWMETER, EM, HEAT REJECTION LOOP
FLOHMBTERS, LUBE/COOLANT LOOP

























* GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUUWEHT
FIGURE H B 5-1
Page 2 of 2
C. STRUCTURAL CONCEPT
The PCS structural cor. :ept is shown in Figure IIC-1 with overall
dimensions and member sizes. It can be seen that the structure is a truss
concept. The center plane and supporting end faces form the basic structure.
The members comprising these sections could be welded together since it is not
necessary to remove any of them for component initial installation or subsequent
maintenance. The center plane lends itself to a truss-type arrangement since the
reservoirs penetrate it and part of the system piping traverses it. The top
plane of the central "I" section is supported by columns in the front and rear
face of the structure. Note that the structure was designed to support a dual
PCS in order to properly assess the required member sizes.
The elements comprising the basis for member selection are shown on
Figure IIC-2. Square and rectangular members were used instead of round members
in order to simplify joint design and component mounting. In addition, for a
given envelope, a round member is heavier than a round membe:- for a given stiff-
ness or conversely, a round member of equal weight and stiffness to a square
member requires more envelope.
Aluminum, carbon steel, and stainless steel were considered for the
structure material. Aluminum was eliminated for the following reasons: (l) use
of aluminum would preclude installation of the HRL radiator around the PCS during
system test. At 600°F, aluminum has poor strength characteristics (see Figure
IIC-3). Secondly, it is felt that the overall cost of fabricating an aluminum
structure would exceed the cost of a steel structure despite the lower material
costs ($1,000 versus $3,300 for stainless steel); this is because a large aluminum
structure would require use of special fixturing and heat treatment in order to
eliminate distortions during fabrication. It is estimated that for similar de-
flection allowables an aluminum frame would weigh about 100 pounds less than a
II C 1
steel frame. At this point, a final selection of stainless versus carbon steel
has not been made.
Stress analysis results for member stresses and deflections are shown
in Figures TIC-k, IIC-5,and IIC-6 for vertical and lateral loads. The structure
and system weights, and overturning moment results appear in Figure IIC-7.















































































































































































REFERENCES A) ASTM STP 12U
B) ASTM STP 180
C) AL. STD AND DATA AL ASSOCIATION,
D) KAISER AL DATA
1969
10,000 HRS

















LATERAL EEFLECTION AND AXIAL STRESS SUMMARY
2-G LATERAL LOAD '••"•"•''•'•'••:'••••'- • '-'"
-: AXIAL: STRESS - psr • '•••





PCS STRUCTURE MAXIMUM STRESS SUMMARY FOR +4130
COMBINED I£AJ> - :5r3:
 :VERTICAL AND 2-G LATERAL













6 Vert. Columns 3" x 2" 10* x 6 = 60'
2 Horiz. 3" x 31* 12* x 2 = 24'
1 Horiz. @ 38" 3" x 2" 12' x 1 = 12'
1 TAA 3" x 2" 5* x 1 = 5*
lj* x li" Diagonal 33* =33'
FRONT FACE = REAR FACE x 2
5 Vert. Col. 2" x 2" 10* x 5 = 50' (x2) = 100*
2 Horiz. 3" x 2" 12* x 2 = 24* (x2) = 48*
1 Horiz. @ 38" 2" x 2" 12* x 1 = 12' (x2) = 24«
l£" x li" Diagonal 23* 23* (x2) = 46*
CROSS BARS BOTTOM AND TOP
Bottom 6 3" x 2" 5* x 6 = 30*
Top 5 3" x 2" 5* x 5 = 25*
BOTTOM DIAGONALS l£" x l£" 28* (1.93) = 54 LB
TOP DIAGONALS l£" x l£n 35* (1.93) = 68 LB
TOTALS
LB/FT LB S.S.
3" x 3" 24* (4.8) 115
3" x 2" 180* (3.98) 715
2" x 2" 124* (3.07) 380
•l£" x li" 142' (1.93) 274
1,484 LB
AL. 1% LIGHTER 1,484 LB (.07) - 1X)4 LB LESS
LB - 104 LB = 1,380 LB








lj-,277 PCS Components k NaK PMA
1,1*00 Frame L/C RES
1,860 El. Comp. Misc.
1,100 +1 Boiler Hg PMA
8,6S7 PLR











NOTE: Above does not include Pipes, Brackets, and Radiators





TAA and Cond, 
f LR 
I r n  
NaK PMA (4) 
L/C ms 





No. 2 Boiler 




88 .O 13.2 
24 .0 7.5 












60 .o 58.4 
- - 
654,o'j 217.5 
Figure I1 C 7 Page 3 of 3 
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: Member Properties Data
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Applied Joad at Joints Input
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Member Depths for Stress Calculation
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COMPUTER ANALYSIS PRINTOUT OF JOIMT TRANSLATIONAL AND ROTATIONAL DISPLACEMENTS
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STRESSES IN MEMBERS
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D. PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS RESULTS
The piping for the intermediate, mercury, and heat rejection loops
shown on Figure IIB1-1, sheet 2, was thermally stressed at the system operating
temperatures. In addition, the piping interface loads vere calculated for .
gravity loading in 1-g for unsupported piping. The computer code "MEC-21" was
used in performing these calculations. The maximum allowable line stresses are
based upon Specification AGC-10650, "Structural Design Criteria, SNAP-8." This
will be discussed in more detail below. The allowable rotating machinery inter-
face loads are based upon existing configuration control drawings for those com-
ponents. It was assumed that static components which have not been designed or
are being modified can withstand interface loads comparable to that which the
connecting piping can accept.
For pipe stress, AGC-10650 has been interpreted as follows:
1. Maximum allowable thermal stress = 2.x material yield strength
at temperature = 2 a y
2. Maximum allowable primary stress = a p (creep strength or yield
strength, depending upon operating temperature)
3. Maximum combined thermal and primary stress = 2 x a y
JK Maximum, allowable pipe stress = (2 a y - a p)/S.F.
5. Applied safety factor = S.F. = 1-5 x K(calculation)/K(material)
where K(material) = 0.85 to allow for variations in material
properties from curve data
(••
K(calculation) = 1.51 and allows for manufacturing vari-
ations, dimensional variations, and load/
model uncertainty
Thus, S.F. = 1-5 x 1.51/0.85 = 2.665
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For example, at 1200°F: a y = 19,200 psi
a p = 6,800 psi (1% creep in 1*0,000 hrs.)
a allowable = (2 x 19,200 - 6,800)/2.665
*(maximum)
= 11,850 psi
A sample of the analysis that was performed in stressing the PCS
piping appears in Figures IID2-1, IID2-2 and IID2-3. Based on the engineering
layout a sketch of the line to be stressed is prepared (Figure IID2-1);- computer
input is prepared and the line is analyzed (Figure IID2-2); finally an engineering
evaluation of the computer output is prepared to determine the acceptability of
the line. A summary of the interface loads imposed upon the components in the
Intermediate, Heat Rejection and Mercury loops appears in Figures IID3-1, IID3-2
and IID3-3. The stress results on the basis of "minimum factor of safety"
appear in Figure IID3-1*-. In some places, the stresses exceeded those allowed by
the design criteria; these are a small percentage of the line elements analyzed and
will be eliminated during the next design phase.
Some of the general results of the piping stress analysis follow:
1. In order to limit stresses in the Intermediate Loop NaK pump
suction lines, the boiler movement will be limited to about 1/2 inch of the full 1
inch travel downward that the boiler height and operating temperature would dictate.
2. The mercury vapor line is located in a horizontal plane so that
thermal expansion bending moments and pipe forces applied at the turbine interface
are transmitted to the TAA center-of-gravity support and not to the turbine exhaust.
3. Some of the pipe lines do not require additional supports in
the l.-g environment (see Figures IID-1, -2, and -3).
k. The intermediate loop and heat rejection loop lines to and from
the radiator are anchored at the PCS structure interface.
5• The WaK diverter valves are considered to be part of the piping
and will not be supported independently.
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6. The HRL Flow Control Valve is allowed to move with the line.
It the valve were anchored, additional piping would be required to reduce the
stresses in the lines between the NaK pump and condenser.
T. The boiler is considered to.be anchored at the mercury vapor
i
outlet end in order to minimize the required line length for the mercury vapor
line. The mercury vapor line should be as short as possible in order to mini-
mize the boiler/turbine inlet line pressure loss and the amount of vapor line
preheat (on startup) required.
8. In general, the only place where the requirement to maintain
1300 F capability for the system piping had a serious impact was in the mercury
vapor line. This is because the vapor line pressure is also affected by tempera-
ture. At the lower temperatures and associated pressure, a 2-1/2-inch x 0.065-inch
or 0.083-inch vapor line would be adequate.
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PCS PIPE S T R E S S C R I T E R I A
(BASED ON SPECIFICATION AGC-10650*)
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE THERMAL STRESS - 2 X YIELD STRENGTH
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY STRESS - YIELD STRENGTH OR 1% CREEP IN 5 YEARS
MAXIMUM COMBINED STRESS • 2 X YIELD STRENGTH
MINIMUM SAFETY FACTOR'- 1.50
MAXIMUM STRESS - MATERIAL ALLOWABLE
MATERIAL ALLOWABlf - 0.85 X CURVE VALUE
MAXIMUM STRESS • 1.51 X CALCULATED STRESS
* REFLECTS USAS B31.7 - "CODE FOR NUCLEAR POWER PIPING"
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RUN NO, P I P I N G F L E X I B I L I T Y A N A - L Y S I S P & H G R A M V K - 2 1 C E
__ . .__**. HEIGHT.. . L C A P I NG. E F F E C T S * .*
PAGE 9 OF 12
ST8FSS C O N D E N S E R NO-l 1C PLP 4-14-70 NO. 110
T Y P F PONT
55-07-001 A N K R B T N P
50-01-0l» TGNT R I M P
4*-01-Ol7 RF>.''*' END
45-01-016 TGNT FNO
4 6-61-015 P E N C FND
40-01-014 T G N T ' E N D '
35-01-013 n P * D FNO
35-01-61? T G N T HMD
30-01-6 fi B F N D END
3 C-01 -01 C T GNT FN.P
!25-Cl-CC9 RENT FNti
.PHIAL .C.O_QR.D_5 ,..L.E.t.G.TH ..r t^ _ IH.CK . .ML).li^S.._.T> tlA_ .JllSP.JLAC£.SlEftlTAf JJJiCHES.
X, IN. Y, IN. 7 , IN. IN. IV. IN. IN. OFC. D E L T A X D E L T A Y D E L T A Z
-2.500 10.500 16.COO 3.0CO C.083 C.COC C.OOO 0.000
-2.500 1C.500 16.000 1.P49 3.0CO C.083 0.000 O.COC C.OOO
-2 .«31 1C.45S 17.597 12.021 3.000 C.083 4.490 153.4 "" O.'bo'o -C.C
-11.737 9.4^5 15.053 7.386 " 3 . 0 C D O . O B 3 " " O.boT ~ -076o 1 -c7
-11.246 S.29P 7.686 1 9. 039 3 .000 0 ,C9? 1270CO 66.1 0.001 C .00 2 -0.000
0.705 8.533 -3.f>C ~ C . P 2 7 3 . 0 0 0 o " . 0 8 3 ~ ' " ' "'"" " " C ~ 0 0 2 C .OlT7-6.66"6"
1.531 P.4Q9 -3.500 18.P?o "s.cCQ C . C ? ? 12.100 ~ 89.9 C.002 " C.Oil - C . C O C
13.500 7.501 8.46«» 0.071 3.000 0.083 0.00 5 C.013 -C.C02
13.500 ~ 7.496 ' f l . 540 18.820 : 3 .OOC< C.C83 Tf.~o66 "a"?^9 6^005~'' "6.61?" '"-0.002"
l .?«0 6.297 2C.500 0.324 3 .000 0.083 "'" 6.C08 0.019 0.002
1.167 fc.275 2C.50C 19.9P2 3 .000 0 .03;2 12.100 S5.4 C."6o8 0.0?6 0.002
0. l40 3. COO 6. OP 3 6.002 0.042 0.006
4.450 3."»00 0.033 12.0CO 21.2 0.002 0.042 0.006
C.C83 ~~ ~ 0.6bi 0.046 .6.~C05
C . C P 3 4.400 6372" bTob'l 0. C47 ""c76o5~
1 .25R 3.000 0.083 -0.000 0.049 6.CC3
6.411 3.000 C . O R 3 4 .250 6T..4 -C.OOO 0.049 6.003
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' • • " ? ' ' 1 3 3 1 3 3
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-2 -31 -3 " 336
-.? -<0 -3 " -114
-2 -40 -3 -117
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I.n EI.CW rLE.w FLLFWFNT PCI N I.
-RP-n. M TYPF POMT X, TN. Y, IN. Z, IN.




? .000 O.O- l *
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A Z U S A . CALIFORNIA
SUBJECT.












HEAT REJECTION LOOP PIPING/COMPONENT INTERFACE LOAD
IKTEHFACS DESCKEPTION
HFMA (No. 2A) Discharge
2" 0-D- x -065" Wall, 316 SST
NPMA (No. 2B) Discharge
2': 0-D- x ,065" Wall, 316 SST
HPMA Allowable
(Ref- AGO Dwg, 09861?)
Ccndenaer Inlet
3" OoD, x ,083" WaU, 316 SST
Condenser Allowable (Inlet)
(%.*> AGO Stress Analysis
SA-C-I27)
Condenser Outlet




































































































Theroal, T = 4l7°P, AT = 342
Weight-- .
Combined




Thermal, T « 4l7°F, ,AT - 342
Weight -
Combined
Thenml, T = 564°F, AT = 489
Welgbt -
Combined
[G= II D 3-1 1 of 3 Pages
HEAT REJECTION LOOP PIPING/COMPOKEHT INTERFACE LOAD SUMMARY
INTBRPACE DESCRIPTION
Condenser Allowable (Outlet)
(Ref, AGO Stress Analysis
* SA-C-127)
PLR Inlet
3" 0,D- x ,083" Wall, 316 S8T
PLR Outlet
3" 0,D, x ,083" Wall, 316 SST
PLR Allowable
(Ref, (Inlet and Outlet) AGC-
10631)
HLR/Structure Interface
(to Heat Sink Inlet)
RRL/Struoture Interface





































































. ^•••-.i-v j..1 -



























Thennal, T - 564°P, AT = 1*8-
Weight -
Combined
Thermal, T • 564°P, AT = U8«
Wel^it -
Combined
Thermal, T «= 564°F, AT « 48$
Weight -
. Cooblned
Thermal,! - lH7°F, AT = 3^2
Weight -
Combined
PIS. n D 3-1 2 of 3 fugee
HEAT REJECTION LOOP FIFBIG/COMPONENT INTERFACE LOAD SUMMARY
INTERFACE DESCRIPTION
NFMA Suction (No. 2A)
2" O.D. x .065" Wan, 316 SST
1JPMA Suction (Ho. 2B)
2" O.Dv x ,.065" Wall, 316 SST
NPMA Allowable



























































Thermal,! «= 4l7°F, AT - 3^2
Weight -
Combined




FIG. H D .3-1 3 of 3 Riff
INTERMEDIATE LOOP ; IMG/COMPONENT INTERFACE LOAD
INTERFACE DESCRIPTION
NPMA-1 Discharge
2" OoD. x .065" Wan, 31688
NPM^-2 Discharge
2" 0,D<. x .065" Wan, 316SS
Boiler No, 1 Inlet
3" 0,Do x .083" Wan, 316S8
Boiler No. 1 Outlet
3" 0,D, x .083" Wan
Boiler No, 2 Inlet
3* 0-D. x .083" Wan
NFMf:. No. 1 Suction























































































































Thermal, 10ll*°F,AT » 939°F





Thermal, n85°F,AT » nK>°F
;
- W t > : ' • - • - " ' . -
Total
Thermal, n85°Fj AT «'.U10<V
W t . • ' . ' • : ; y . " . , - . - •
Total
Thermal n85°F, AT - niO°F
Wt«
Total
VltA MMK ^  1 ft! K^V f\ V • OllO iff




Page 1 of 2
EKEEMBDIATS LOO. JIPXNG^CGMPQ&HIX INTERFACE LOAD
INTERFACE DESCRIPTION
KE4A No. 2 Suction





































Thenaal, 1015°? AT « 9*0°P
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MERCERY LOOP PIPHSKJ/COMPOIEIIT LOAD SUMMARY
INTERFACE DESCRIPTION
Hg PMft. Suction Allowable
HG PMA Suction


























































































960 in Ibs - Bending




















Thermal, T » Ul7°F
Weigrt
Combined
Thermal, T = lH7°F
Wsigbt • . ' . ' . "
Conbined
Thermal, T = U90°F
Wbigbt
Cnmh^nod













A N A L Y S I S RESULTS









DESIGN CRITERIA: MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY - 1.50
PI PING/COMPONENT APPLIED INTERFACE LOADS ARE WITHIN ALLOWABLES
Figu re 11 D 3-4
E. FLUID ANALYSIS
The main criteria used in calculating the PCS loop pressure losses
is the existing pump motor asseciblies head-capacity characteristics. In addition,
in order to minimize the volume occupied "by piping, the piping diameters were
selected to be as small as possible without providing pressure losses in excess
of the PCS pump capabilities.
Pressure Loss calculations were performed for the intermediate loop,
mercury loop, and heat rejection loops. The results of this analysis appear in
Figures IIE2-1, IIE2-2, IIE3-1, IE33-2, and IIEU-1, including a loop schematic
for each system with the calculated pressure losses and a system pressure loss
and pump head rise curve versus system flow for the NaK loops. The loop schematics
include the system pressure losses appearing on the state-point diagram.
Component pressure losses are based upon component test data wherever possible
(see Fig. IIE3-3 and IIE3-4 for example). In addition, the Intermediate Heat
Exchanger pressure losses were calculated as part of an IHX conceptual design
(Fig. IIE2-3). A sample analysis of the type used in calculating system pressure









•n, PI MP CHA ^ ACTEP ESTIC
&GC Cfu rve^S J2-65-p0055/
CURVE (10UO° ?)
10,000 20,000 30,000 U0,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
H PLOWj LB/HR
PCS INTERMEDIATE LOOP FLOW CHARACTERISTICS




















^LINE - ILPMA TO ILNDV
^VALVE - ILNDV
v-LDJE - ILNDV TO PCS/RPL
INTERFACE
KPI< IHX and Piping in RPL
^ LINE r- PCS/RPL INTERFACE* TO
BOILER NO. 1
• BOILER NO. 1
''LINE - BOILER NO. 1 TO
BOILER NO. 2
v BOILER NO. 2
''LINE - BOILER NO. 2 TO
ILPMA NO. 1
NOTE: CALCULATED AP TOTAL 14.25
ILPMA PRESSURE RISE 18.10
MARGIN ( AP) 3.85


























P-g-70 FMQIMFFRIMQ FILE NO._S«303J&
1139-01-0501 EOF SERIAL NO. —
SNAP-8 ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
SUBJECT:
INTERMEDIATE HEAT EXCHANGER ERELIMBTART DESK2T
ABSTRACT:
The following calculations were performed to determine a conceptual configuration for
a double contained tube-in- shell, 600 KWT, intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) for the
PCS-G RPL section (reference memo J+96V70-002U dated 13 February 1970. titled Tube-in-
Shell Intermediate Heat Exchanger, Conceptual Design (see attachment)). HOC initial
requirements were: heat load - 600 Ktf, flow - 65,000 Ib/hr, fluid (all passages) - NaK,
RPL inlet temperature - 1200T", LMED - 20T1, IHX material - 3l£ SS and structural design
temperature - 11*00 F. An initial pressure drop analysis was performed using a 7 1/2 in.
O.DJ shell and 8 configurations of tubing varying from 3/l6 in. O.D. IL tube - 7/16 in.
O.D. static NaK tube to 1 1/k in. O.D. IL tube - 1 1/2 in. O.D. static NaK tube.
Limiting parameters were 3 psi max tube side pressure drop, 1 psi max shell side
pressure drop and max 3HX length of 20 ft. Initial analysis results showed that
the smaller tube configurations produced excessive pressure drop and the larger
tube configurations provided poor heat transfer properties. A thermal analysis was
performed on the -remaining mid-range configurations and the results indicated that a
1/2 in. x .035 in. wan IL tube and a 5/8 in. x .035 in. wall static NaK tube provided
the best combination of low pressure drop and adequate heat transfer. An additional
analysis was performed, varying the shell size while keeping the tubing configuration
fixed. The results indicated that by utilizing a 9 1/2 in. I.D. shell, 121 tubes could
be usfed resulting in a IHX that formed on3y one flat coil in the gallery envelope. An
eccentric shell type manifold was designed to provide equal flow radially into the shell
from the RPL inlet line. The IL Inlet and outlet manifolds were designed considering
resistance coefficient (k) values. A sudden expansion for the inlet manifold and a
gradual contraction for the outlet manifold provides the smallest "K" values.
The quantity and weight of NaK in the REL, IL, and static loops was determined and
the weight of the UK was determined.
The results are as follows:
- 9.88 in. O.D. x .120 in. wall
Number of tubes - 1P1
DISTRIBUTION:
None
KEY WORDS: intermediate Heat Exchanger, SNAP-8, Reactor Primary Loop, PCS-G,
Combined System Test
DATE
R. L. Tom 2-2-70
REVIEWED DATE
Figure IIE2-3a
ENGINEERING DESK3T FILE SUMMARY D496&-70-OU60
2-2-70
H, fluid tube ! - 1/2 in. x .035 in. wall
Static NaK tube - 5/8 in. x .035 in. wall
Pitch/diameter - 1.252
Tube length - 103.5 in.
Tube AP - .286 psi
Shell AP - .066 psi
IL inlet - sudden expansion - K * .79 AP = .355 psi •
IL outlet - gradual contraction - K = .OU AP = .018 psi
Wt of RPL NaK @ 75/F = 122.^ 5 Ib
Wt of IL NaK @ 75 F =67.01 Ib
Wt of static NaK® 75 F = 19.8H Ib
Total wt of full IHX @ 75°F = 8kk.k9 Ib
Vol of RPL NaK = 391^  in"3 .,
Vol of IL NaK = 211*5.U8 in"3 -
Vol of static NaK = 633.9 ±0.
TOTAL XL AP*
Figure If E2-3b
SAMPLE SYSTEM PRESSURE LOSS CALCULATION USING
MULTIPLE-LOOP FLOW ANALYSIS COMPUTER PROGRAM
TMUFAN)
MUFAN CARU_JN£UJ..J.1SJJN.G ..***'**************** 05/14/70 TIME





























OCCOCCG001 111 111 1 112222222222 33333333 3344444444445555555555666666666 677 7 777 7777,



























BUILER Tu MPMAS DP LOSS




18 . 20 .375
20 22 .812
2<! 24 .375

















































.INT. LOOP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS WORST CONDITION


























































_j 10000. j .00004
Le/uo ..00004






















Pig. II E 2-
M.UFAM..C.A.KD.. INPU.J LISTIMi>******************* 05/14/7C T I M E * • « •
CARC CAHC COLUMNS














































































































































































































































































Fig. II E 2-4 ID
































' . CARD COLUMNS
OCCCC00001 111! 11 1112222222222 3333 3333 3344444444445555 555555666666666 b7777 7777778
















. . . . .
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Fig.. II E 2-4 c
CARD INPUT.LIST ING ******************* 05/14/7C TIME




91 M 331 '332 '" ." .375 ""73.~C "^ 083 "90~ ^y " "" .00006
92 M 322 334 i25C 3.J, .083 1 .00006
93 M 334 335 .375 3.C ."C83 90 17 .00006
94 M 335 337 1.125 3.0 .083 1 .00006
95 M 337 339 , .375 3.C .083 180 14 .00006
9t M 339 341 • 2i.,??C 3. C .083 _ JL .00006
97 M 341 342 .375 3.C .083 90 17 .00006
98 M 342 344 U.-833 3.C ..OS 3 __ . _ 1 .00006
99 M 244 345 .37IJ 3.C '.083. 9~0 17 .00006
IOC M 345 346 .3/5 3.C .083 90 17 .00006
101 M 346 346 .625 3.C .083 1 .00006
IP* H' 348 349 .375 3.C .C8_3 90 17 .00006
1U3 V 349 352 :3.25C 3.C .083 1 .00006
104 M 35_2 353 »375 3.C .083 90 17 .00006
105 M'. 353 356 -: :2.92C 3.C".(J83 1 .00006
lOt K 356 357 >375 3.C .083 4JL _ 14 .0000^
107 M 357 425 . . : 3
lOe J". -*25 427 , .66 3.0 .083 1 .00004
109 -» 427 42S / -.;812 3.c".063 180 14 " .00004
110 K %29 431 . »25 3.0 .083 1 .00004
111 M"431 433 "'" .33 ~3~.C .08~3 " 90~ " ~" 17 " .OC004
112 M 423 435 2.33 3.0 .083 1 .00004
113 M 435 437 1.0 3.6 .083 90 17 .00004
U4 M 437 439 5.5 3.0 .083 1 .00004
. 115 H 439 441 1.C 3.C .083 90 17 .00004
116 M 44i 443 1.82 3.0 .083 1 - ' .00004
117 ' ' ' P. 443 445 ' "l.C 3.C .083 30 14 * .00004
116 * 445 447 .06 3.0 .083 . 1 .00004
119 M 447 446 ' . .,, 4
0000 40000 45000 50000 5500C 60SOO 65000 70000
Fig. II E 2-k d
M U f A N . .CA.B..O. I.NP.UT .ULSI INO ...„***************'**'** 0 5 1 4 / 7 0 T I M E ....
CARC __ , . : . ._ . C A R C COLUMNS _ ._ . . • ._ - . .... .
SEC. OCOOC006oilH1111112222222222233333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
NU. 1234567690123^^
121 CP P 1 .13 .25 ~.A5 "775 — ••••.••--•-—•^ ^? ^-Q 2.3
122 CU P 3 lOOOe 2000C 30000 40000 __45jQ00 5K)0.00 55000 60000 65U.OO 70000
123 CP P 3 .20 ~ .4C .75 1.25 1.6 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.5 4,1
124 Ci. P .4 1000C 2000C 3COCC 40POO 45000 50000 55000 60000 65000 70000
125 CP P 4 .20 ,4C .75 1.25 1.6 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.5 4.1
Fig. II E 2-4
************************************ • ' •wFi i Q»i.J>ttr iCTcRJLST ILS ** 05/14/70 '-* PAGE 1 ".c
• • • — • ~
KfcMBEK.
T Y P E
LENUH, FT.
C.U., IN. (Dl)
*ALL T H I C K N t S S
RADIUS/ F T .




K - F A C T G H
LAbtL
BCILt f t T^ \ f - X A S OP LCiS.IM. LCCP. ASSu/*e T
NPMAS A\C CricCK V A L V t TC IHX PKtSSUKfc LOSS
* 1C - 12




, IN * • o.cesc
* C.375
* *> C • C







S T R A I G H T P I F c
l.^Ou
3.000























. ••- ' • • - • • ' •
































T Y P E
•
L tNCTHi F T .
U.D.i IN. (Dl)
i iALt'-tb-iCKNESSf IN
















































































************************************ MjFAN MEMtJEP FLGw CHARACTER ISTLCS.** 05/14/70 ** PAGE 2 OF 14 *
ECILER TC N P K A S UP LLSS. INT. LCCP. ASSUME LNLPMA 2 IS «CKST CONDITION
NPMAS ANi, CHECK V A L V t TO IHX PRESSURE LUS's
PEKfER * . . . .26 - 28
T Y P E * TU8ING BtNU
• *
LENCTH, FT. * ********C.D., IN: ton *
V » A L L Th
K A C I U S ,



















T Y P E
LENCTH,




,b ALL T H
















































28 - 3.0 ...._
S T R A I G H T PIPE
0.812
3.000


















































































































Fig. II E 2-1* g
*****4***«************************** MEMBER FLCiw.. CHARAC.TERIST ic.s ** ...05/14/70 *# PAGE 3 OF. 14 *
bCtLER TC NPKAS DP LCSS.INT. LGCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS WORST CONDITION
NPMAS ANC CHECK VALVE TU IrtX PRESSURE LOSS
P. t MEEK
T Y P E




















K - F A C T ^ R








































* <»<» - 46..






































































































































*Fig. II E 2-4 h
»****<****************************** MEMBER FLUw CHAKACT E.R I ST ** 05/14/70 ** PAGE OF 14 *
fiClLER TO NPNAS DP LC SS. I M . LUCP. ASSUME IN.LPMA 2 IS WCRST CONDITION
NPMAS AND CHECK VALVE TC IHX PR6SSUKfc LOSS
KEMt tR
T Y P t
LENGTH, FT.










T Y P E
L E N G T h , FT.
(J.D., IN. (Ul)
HALL THICKNESS,




t w O i V . L / C
K - F A C T U H



































































































































6 6 - 6 8













































































Fig. II E 2~
************************************ MEMBER. FLUto CHARACTERI STICS ** 05/14/70 ** PAGE 5 OF 14 -*
BCILER TU NPflAS OP LCSS.INT. LOCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2
NPMAS AND CHECK VALVE TO IHX PRESSURE LOSS
IS WCkST CONDITION
MEKfiER
T Y P E
LENGTH, FT.
C.C., IN. (D l )






K- F A C T O R
LABEL
MEMBER
T Y P t







E Q U l v . L / C
K - F A C T G F











































































































































































































Fig. II E 2-k J
*«***4*«**************************** KUFAN MEMBCK FLGw CHARAC.TEB4STICS ** 05/14/70 *'* PAGE 6 OF
TG NPMAS DP LCSS.IM. LCLP. ASSUME 1NLP*A 2 IS WCRST CONDITION
NPMAS AND CHECK VALVt TO IHX PRESSURE LOSS
MEMBER
































































































































































































































Fig. II E 2-k k
Hi*********************************** MEH8CK..F.LGh. CHAKAC.TER.IS.TICS ';** 05/14/70 ** PAGE 7 OF
dCtLtR TU NP.MAS OP LCSS.INT. LCCP. ASSUME INLPfA 2 IS WGkST CONDITION
NPMAS ANC CHtCK VALVE TO IHX PRESSURE LOSS
KEMtJEK
T Y P L
L E N C T h , F T .
U.O., IN. (01)
W A L L T H I C K N E S S ,
R A O l L S i F T .
ANGLE, C f cG .
C2, IN.
RUUtHNESS, IN.
EwUiV . L /C
K - F / > C T C K
LAbEL
l*EMeER








• E C U IV . L /C













































































































































































































Fig. II E 2-4 1
I (
*****<************#***************** KUFAN MEMBER.FLU* .Ch.AR'ACJ.fcRI STICS- ** 05/14/70
,:; eClLtK 1C AFNAS OP LLSS.IMT. LCCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS WCRST CONDITION
:'. NPMAS AND CHECK VALVE TO IHX -PRESSURE LOSS





























































































































































































































































Fig. II E-2-fc m
*4«**x********v********************* VEM6EA CHARACTERISTICS ** 05/14/70
eciLE* rc NPMAS CP LCSS.INT. LCCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 is HCRST CONDITION
NFMAS AM) CHECK VALVE TO IHX PRESSukt LOSS
**:PAGE 9 OF 14 *
MtMfcth
T Y P E
LENGTH, FT .
C.U., IN. (01)
f tALL IH ICKMSS,
RAU IoS i FT.
A K G L E , L E G .
C2, IN.
K U U G H N E S S , IN.
ECUl.V. L /C
K-F £ C T L K
L A B E L
MEMBER
T Y P E
L E N G T H , F l .
U.D., IN. (01)











































S T R A I G H T PIPb
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Fig. II E 2-k
************************************ V O F A N MEMttEts FLO* C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S .** 05/14/70
bClLER FG NPMAS UP LLSS.IM. LUCP. ASSUMt 1KL.PKA 2
NPMAS AND CHECK VALVL TO IHX PKtSSuRt LOSS
IS WORST CONDITION
*.* 'PAGE 10 GF 14 *
MEMEER
TYPt
L E N G l K t FT.
U.L/.t IN. (01 )
W A L L THICKNESS,
RAU 1LS i FT.
ANGLEt CtG.





























































































































































































































































Pig. II E 2-4 o
it********************************** MUFAN KtM&ER FLCh CHARACTERISTICS ** 05/14/70
/
BCILER TO NPN/»S JP LLSS.INT. LCCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS WORST CONDITION
NPMAS ANG CHtCK VALVfc TU 1HX PRCSSUKE LOSS
** PAGE 11 OF 14 *
MtKfcE*
T Y P E -
L E N C T H , F T .
O.u., IN. Oil
*ALL T H l C K N t S S ,
R A C l u S , F T .




K-F 0 C T G H
L A b c L
KtMEt*
T Y P L
L E N G T H , F T .
U.O., IN. (U l )
W A L L T h I C K N L S S t
HALHuS, FT.
































































































































































































































*Fig. II E 2-b p
PuFAN ME.MdEk FLOtv CHARAC T6RI STICS ** 05/14/70 ** PAGE 12 OF 14 *
BCILER 1C NPtfAS CP LCSS.
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.Fig. II S 2-U
******************$***************** |*tMbbK FLOW C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S ** 05/14/70 ** PAGE 13 OF 14 *
eClL t * TL N P N A S GP L C S S • INT.
NPMAS ANl CHtCK V A L V E TO IHX
MEMBER
T Y H L
L E N G T h , »=T.
U.L.r IN. ( Jl )
w A L L THICKMISS,
RA l lUS , F T .




K - F A C r C R
LA6EL
MEMtER
T Y P t
L E N G T H , F T .
C.U., IN* (Jl )
W A L L T H I C K N E S S ,




EOUlv . L / C





































« « * * « <T*
o.5i)G
^25 - A 2 7







































LGCP. A S S U M E INLPMA 2 IS W C f c S T CCNCIT
PRESSURE LOSS
353 -356
















































































































































Fig. II E 2-4 r
************************************ NUFAN MEMBER FLU* CHARACTERISTICS ** 05/14/70 -
BC1LER TC NPNOS UP LCSS.INT. LUCP. ASSUME 1NLPMA 2 IS wORST CONDITION
NPMAS AND CHECK VALVE TO Iri X PRESSURE LOSS
** PAGE OF
MEMBER
T Y P t
L E N v l T H , F T .
I). I)., IN. (Jl)
W A L L TH ICKNESS,
RADIUS, F T .
ANoLE , LEG.
C2, IN.
R C U G H N t S S , IN.
ECU I V. L/C
.K -FACTUR
L A b t L
KilMEER
T Y P E
L E N G T H , Fl.
U.O., IN. (01)
W A L L THlCKi\ .EiS,





K - F A C T G R



























S T R A I G H T PIPE
3

































































































4 3 7 - 4 3 9

































































































1= NCl;MI)= 1 NST= 1 \Fi\= 1 h\a. t ( I ) = 0 Fig. II S 2-U s
NPBP= o M;UMBP = i
IBRPI, IBCCN* JHRPT I I . 1.. . 2
I3KPT, I6CCN, JBRPI 2 2 - 1 1
Fig. II E 2-4 t
< ( ( ( ( i
bKAI\CH FLOS
1 1. CCGCCE C<»
Fig. II E 2-4 u
8 K A I S L H . P O I N T . . P R E S S U R t S
1 5-OOCCOt Cl
( ( Fig. II E 2-1*. v
( i















































































G . S C 3 1 E - C 3
ISPPAS OP L C S S . I N T . LCCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS
CHECK V A L V E TO IHX PRESSURt LOSS
E L E V A T I O N F R I C T I O N
PKESSURE PRESSURE




















































































































































































































































'Pig. II E 2-4 v
******4*********#**#********4**» MUFAI\ FLOW AND PRESSURE CROP PRINTOUT * 05/14/7C **** ** PAGE 2 OF . S.*
ECiLEH Tu NPKAS UP LCSS.IIVT. LOCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS WORST CONDITION
;-M ... ; NPMAS ANU CHECK VALVE TU IHX PRESSURE LOSS ^
PKtSSUkfc
















































































































4 5 5 0 E - C J


















































































































































































































































Fig. II E 2-i
4***#**t********4*************** MUFAN fLOW AND PRESSURE ORUP PRINTOUT * 05/14/70 **** ** PAGE 3 OF 5 *
BCILEK 1C NPWAS OP LCSS.INT. LLCP. ASSUME IM.PKA 2 IS WLRST CONDITION
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Fig. II E 2-4 y




























































































NPMAS UP LCSS.INT. LGCP. ASSUME INLPMA 2 IS



















































































































































































































































































Fig. II E 2-k z
*************«*4*«**«***«******* NUFAN FLCw AND t-'RcSSURE CKLP PRINTOUT * 05/14/7C **** ** PAGE 5 OF 5. *
BCILER TG KPKAS DP LCSS.INT. LCCP. ASSUME IM.PKA 2 IS wGRST CCNCITION
NPMAS ANC CHECK VALVE TO IHX PRESSURE Lt3SS
ELEVATION
PRtSSUkt PktSSURE
M£*'BE-R GKOP, PSI CKCPt PSI

































/?fcv- : : r ...... ..0! ^ .
Fig. II E 2-4 aa
MIFAN .P.K.ES.S.URE PKINJOU.1 ******* 05/14/70****** ** PAGE . .1 OF ..!...*
eCILER TO NPMAS OP LCSS.INT. LCCP. ASSUMED INLPMA 2 IS fcCRST CONDITION
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Fig. II E 2-k
IARACTERI5TIC
*EF. 4932-ff-OOO
10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
HRLFLOW, LB/HR






























LINE - HRPMA TO HRNDV
VALVE - HRNDV
LINE - HRNDV TO HRFCV
VALVE - HRFCV
LINE - HRFCV TO CONDENSER
CONDENSER
LINE -'CONDENSER TO PLR
PLR
LINE - PLR TO PCS INTERFACE
LINE TO HRL RAD., HRL RAD.,
LINE FROM HRL RAD.
LINE PCS INTERFACE TO HRPMA
COMPONENT COOLING CIRCUIT
NOTE: A P .TOTAL 19.-42
NPMA PRESSURE RISE 2^ .50
MARGIN (A?) +5-08






































CURVE BASED ON HYDRAULIC TEST
DATA FOR PLR P/N 097223
PCS DESIGN POINT
(0.97 PSI @ 55,000 #/HR)
8000 16000 24000 32000 40000 48000 56000
HRL Nak FLOW (LB/HR)
FIGURE IIE-3-3
SNAP-8 CONDENSER Nak SIDE PRESSURE LOSS VS. Nak FLOW




































55/ ,0013 L B/l4R
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
Nak FLOW x10~4 (LB/HR)
FIGURE IIE-3-4





















































HG PMA PRESSURE RISE 48l.5
FIGURE IIE-4-1
The CST/PCS Preliminary Measurement Requirements List presents the
minimum number of instrumentation channels required for the operation of &
single PCS. In compiling this list, a "2 out of 3" sensor philosophy for all
automatic shutdown parameters has been usert. This means that three separate
sensors measure each automatic shutdown parameter, and that at least two out
of each set of three sensors must indicate an alarm condition before an auto-





























































































































































































































































1L PMA #1 Input Current 0 1
1L PMA ,-fe Input Current 0 1
Hg H-IA. Input Current 0 1
HRL PMA #1 Input Current 01
HRL PMA.
 7r2 Input Current 0 1 :
Alternator Output Voltage 0 1
Alternator Output Voltage 0 2
Alternator Output Voltage # 3
Alternator Output Current 0 1
"i.ternator Output Current 0 2
Alternator Output Current 0 3
Alternator Output Poirer 0 1
Alternator Output Rwer 0 2
Alternator Output Power 0 3
PLR Input Current 0 1
PLR Input Current 0 2
ELR Input Current 0 3
L/C MA Input Current 01
Vehicle load Input Freer 0 1
Vehicle Load Input Bauer 0 2



























Signal goes to Programmer
Figure H P 2
ftjge 1




Ihternediate Heat Exchanger Inlet Systen Diagnostic Flcmmeter
Intennedlate Heat Exchancer Ihlet System Diagnostic *EM Floameter
Zhtenaedlatd Heat Exchanger Inlet System Diagnostic •EM Ploumeter
*2 out of 3 i&ilosophy -
This meastirement allows
for switch-over to stand-
by pump without reactor
scraa or fast setback.
Figure II P 2
Page 2
CST/PCS - I-EASDHEIENT KEQUIWEiEHTS LIST *'
PARAMETER :
MEASURAHD








GST/PCS PRELIMINARY MEASUREMETJT RBiUIREME3nS, LX9T
PARAMETER: —SKH -, -







HRL Condenser Inlet aaercency iSbutdorm *EM Flowaetar
HRL Condenser Inlet Bnergency Shutdcwn *EM Flowneter
Inlet to naK Pump & Reactor
Shield Hx Cooling Circuit System Diagnostic EM Flotnaeter
Inlet to AHX Circuit System Diagnostic
out of 3 philosophy
Kgure n P 2
Page k









L/C Alternator Inlet System Diagnostic Turbine-type Plow Transducer
L/C MEUA Ifotor Inlet System Diagnostic Turbine-typa Flaw Transducar
L/C 1EMA Space Seal In System Diagnostic Turbine-type Plc«; Transducer
L/C PMV Outlet System Diagnostic Turbine-type Plow Transducer
Figure U F 2
Page 5














His Injection Reservoir Bellows
Position Control & Start Up Signal COGS to Programmer












Figure H F 2
Page 6






ILPMA #1 & $2 Ihlet Conponent & System Diagnosis
ILEMA. .^ Outlet Conponent 8b System Diagnosis
2UMA $2 Outlet Component & System Diagnosis
ILHX 2iilet/Diverter Valve Outlet Conponent & System Diagnosis
Boiler 3iilet/IIHX Outlet Conponent & System Diagnosis
II F 2






Eg PMA Inlet/Condenser Outlet
PURPOSE
Component & Syaten Diagnostic
Bg PMA Outlet Component & System Diagnostic
Boiler Outlet/TAA Inlet Component & Systen Diagnostic
TAA Outlet/Condenser Inlet j! Start-up Control Signal goes to Programmer
Across Hg Liquid Venturi Component & Systen Diagnostic
Actross Hg Vapor Venturi ;i Cbnponent & System Diagnostic
Condenser Inlet | Shui;doim (Overpressure) Pressure Switch, 2 out of 3
Tondenscr Inlet Shutdown (Overpressure) Pressure Si/itch, ?. out of 3
Condenser Inlet jn (Overpressure) Pressure S'.^ .tch, 2 out c-i'
Stand-by Boiler Hg Outlet Safety Vacuum 1-feasurement
Figure II F 2
Page 3
CST/FCS PRELIMINARY MEASUREMENT REQUIREMENTS LIST






Component & System Diagnostic
REMARKS
HRBffl. #1 Outlet Component & System Diagnostic
HRR-M. #S Outlet Component & System Diagnostic
Diverter Ouctlet/FCV Hilet Conponent &-.System Diagnostic
PCV Bilet/Condensor Ihlet Component & System Diagnostic
Condenser Outlet/PLR jfalet Component & System Diagnostic
PLR Outlet/Radiator Bilet Component & System Diagnostic
figure H F 2
Rige 9








Component & Systen Dic^nostic
REJ'ARKB
LC H-IA Outlet Component & Systen Diagnostic
TAA Ihlet Component & Systen Diagnostic
TAA Outlet Component:-& Systen Diagnostic
Efe PMA Outlet Component & System Diagnostic
Figure H P 2
Pace 10








ILPM #1 End Turn
ILFtl\ $2 EndxTurn
e II ? 2
Pace :i.l
CST/PCS PRELIMINARY 132ASUREMEHT REQUIREMENTS LIST
HEASURAHD
Hg PM Outlet/Boiler Inlet
Hg Boiler Outlet/TAA. Inlet
Hg TAA Out let /Condenser Inlet
Hg Condenser Outlet /Hg Pl-IA. Inlet ,.
.










Turb. Brngo Outer Race • Component Diagnostic
Drive End 3
i
\lt« Brng. Outer Race !
Anti-Drive End ;





1Alternator End Turn {Component Diagnostic
Alternator Stator










Figure II F 2
Page 12













Condenser Outlet/PLR Jhlet |: Systen Diagnostic
PLR Oublet/Kadlator Inlet Systen Diagnostic
Radiator Oufclet/HRPMA.'s Inlet Systen Diagnostic
m #1 End Turn
!
Component Diagnostic
HRPMA #2 End Turn Component Diagnostic
Figure IX F 2
Page 13










L/C .Radiator Outlet Systen Diagnostic
L/C Lotr Temp, Radiator Outlet . ..




. 1 System Diagnostic
L/C Alternator luilet Start-up
^S^^-V^A^-;^v~.M-;--.v'-»';^'-A'':5-'-?'-'i
Figxrt'e El F ?.
CST/PCS PHEUMINARy MEASUREMENT RBftUIRBMKN'JSJ LIST
PARAMETER: _ ROTATIONAL SPEED
LOOPS All
MEASUBAND PURPOSE REMARKS
Alternator - Speed Energency Shutdown Signal goes to
Altarnator - Ereqjianoy Emergency Shutdown Signal goes to
Figure n F 2
Rige 15




IL PMA. #1 Acceleration









..1A .f\o-M;eleration (Vertical) Safety/Oonponent Diagnostic
TAA Acceleration (Axial) Safety/Component Diagnostic
3-14\ #1 Acceleration Safety/Component Diagnostic
EBL H-la #2 Acceleration Safety/Conponent Diagnostic
L/C HI/V Acceleration Safety/Caniponent Diagnostic
i II
15
, - • • ' . POWER SYTEhw DIVISION




DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTION: PAGE OF FMEA.
ITEM NO.
DATE 15 May 1970
INITIALS .REVISION Q
FAILURE MODE. FAILURE CAUSE






1. Excessive fluid pres-
sure in Mercury Injection
iteservoir/Reservoir-loop


















suildup in Hg loop..
2a) Gases "-desorb" fror
piping and component
walls. . . ' . . . . . ' . . ' ,
b) Gase.s not completely
removed•from loop dur-
ing initial evacuation,
c) Hp transport from
reactor. • : .


















.Critical la. Close couple valve to
reservoir.to decrease the
valve critical closing time
(2 x L/C where L=distance
between valve and reservoir
c = speed of sound in Hg).
Ib. Use Hg .line diameters.
which, decrease velocity of
mercury, hence pressure
rise on sudden valve closurt
Ic. Specify, minimum permitt<
closing time for;yalye. .
2a) Provide-electric heater
for JJ.quid .lines ' tb"-pr.oabte
.outrgassing of walls :of loo;
during system .evacuation,
.b). Intermediate loop signi-
ficantly reduces-H2 trans-•
port to Hg loop,
c) Consider design.:for TAA
and HgPHA', which vent Hg and




* HIGH - Two or more "occurrencea of failure mode in tea ling.
MODerate - One recorded occurrence. ; .;
LOW - No recorded occurrences.
•••"•••..••••„• ' .' -'• "-..' -
;
 fluid
. '•; , . d) Hg valves should have '
, : ' ' . . " ' . • ••" ' , controls independent of nor
mal programmer functions so
** CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard. fchafc they can be opened dur
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits. ing initial loop evacuation
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have nonsignificant effect on the ability
of the system to perform its primary function. :.V
FIGURE III, Page 1
1*925:67:0126
POWER SYTEk DIVISION


















•- 6 ••• ' ..
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATTONS
3. Loss of HRL flow to
the Auxiliary Heat Ex-
changer .
3a) Oxide plugging of
line from HRL to RPL.
b) Return line from AH)
to the HRL interface
is not installed (but
the interfaces are '
capped so that.the NaK
is"dead-ended" in the
AHX. ..' ' . •-
* .
c) Valve in the line t<
the AHX (solenoid




















Critical 3. Switch to second PCS HRL
The reason for including
failure cause 3b is to indi
cate that there are lines '
associated with the HRL ..
which are not part of the
PCS and will not be suppliei
with it. .The return line
from the AHX is connected '
to the HRL heat sink so
that it i s routed between .




sponsibility and ..this type






To prevent oxide plugging
consider: a) maintain flow .
through -the AHX circuit ,
during'purification of the
HRL so it is not a "dead-
6F Idi'-e bct-uffeiiees bf' failure rnu^e .in testing. '" .••
MODerate - One recorded occurrence.
LOW - No recorded occurrences. . ;
' - . ' - *
** CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits.
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability,
of the system to perform its primary function. . ,'
i - "* t*c
FIGURE III, Page 2
1*925:67:0126
POWER SYTEi-_Y DIVISION




DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTION: PAGE 3 OF FMEA
JPCS
ITEM NO.
DATE 15 May 1970
,., -INITIAL Q REVISION
FAILURE MODE. FAILURE CAUSE





3. continued (Loss of HRL
flow to the AHX).
b) Purify HKL over a long
time period.to prevent largi
temperature gradient s in th<
loop from .occurring.; : , . • '•:•
c) Purify'"the HRL before thi
•other NaK loops so that
temperature gradients be-
tween the other,NaK loops
which have components coole<
by- the HRL and .the' HRL do.
;.hpt cause oxide precipita-
tioh ,ih the .HRL by. induced
temperature gr.adiehts.,
Analyze, the system, to .see
if> it is ipp^sible to switch
from;one HRL to the. second
if; the AHX .coolant line' is
inoperative, ^in a timely .
mariner. (:': .:.-'-;••':''!-' :>•' ;:.-y: • ••••
Reconsider -providing a:: -
: separate^ '^ AHX NaK cpblant,;;'
•..loop. ;^ Vx-'Y.''fx r •'/- v'^ f:v: :|v'
* HiliJJ -- TWo 8? More b(?i:ufrences of. f'ailurfe mode iti tea bingi Y : Y Y • Y * ':•;"".':;;.' ::
MODerate - One recorded occurrence. ; ; • :; Y • . .,,.;.••.
LOW - No recorded occurrences. '•' >•
»..*/CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.'"v.-;j.w
'.', MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits. Y ' Y'*
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability V
of the system to perform its primary function. , .. . . . . . - ' • FIGURE III, Page 3:'
1*925:67:0126.
POWER . SYTf*V DIVISION




DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTION: PAGE ,OF FMEA
DATE 15 Mav 1970
ITEM NO. •INITIAL^  REVISION






Loss of NaK pump motor;
gar, fill in vacuum envir-
onment .
Leak in motor Thermo-
couple installation.
Motor operate^





to pump terminals (all .-
pumps).
Excessive voltage drop
in lines from power :
supply to pump. ..."
Poor conductor/terminal



















Note:., The NaK pump moto? it
' gas filled to helip
heat ;transf er from ste.tor :v
to -NaK coolant. .At pne time
pump wa s • rxui' with motor
 :
evacuated but it: could not
always . remain evacuated be-
cause of ,;air leakage . in;
the converse problem now
exists. ,
Base harness design on full
scale: PCS mockup so that
actual harness .lengths can
be the basis for sizing con
due tors. „ -*•• ». f
Weld "conductor a to. terminal
to prevent full or partial
open .circuits. * .. ' ";/
Calculate harne s s tempera-! ;
ture so that actual coriduc-
:
 •> :!!!"!! "~ 'TV.-)" .?«r .liioro! "cH;:r-.u;re:-:;^ --o of f^ lli'irf .\--*,s:'S}^ ':'?r.'\'ri(''*"''~~':'~-''•'•''''''<.,'•: ' •'"'' ,•""•••'•;"'"'-":. ^  -^
'"'"llLGII - Two or more oci:u.rrcnbeo of failure mode, in ,,tesi;irig. • . .•: .
MODerate - One recorded occurrence. ; ^ /
 ; ' . ,
-LOW - No recorded occurrences. .
• - ' ' - ' ' ' * • 'C '''.'
'."**- CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR -'.A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits.
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability,
of the system to perform its primary function. -. , ..-; /
.':.c-an '.-CA-:
-" design'.
.^FIGURE lil ,_.';-Page'" U- *; ;r":
U985:67:012'6
POWER SYTEi... DIVISION
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
PART NO. . _r PK^ RTPTTOl» «7 FflMnTTON; 'PAGE J _ :- OF FMEA ' : ;
PART NAME PCS .. • ' . . . • . .DATE 15 May 1970 ' ' - •
LOOP ITEM NO. ' ! INITIAL^  REVISION PI
' •••'• .... ' .1 '•'. ','• •' '"••'
•• ' ' • " ,• '-.'<•
FAILURE MODE.. '.;..
6. Poor velocity profile
of NaK entering RPMA.
'- . • * ' - ;
''•••" .' ' •
• _ ; ' . * _ ' !
7 . NPMA motor insulation




;; . ' '''"• ..;'•''
 ;i:: .'•••' •"' ;•'•.••,"-.•••.. •••2 .,/
' . ' . . . - . . . ' . • " • ' •'.-• . •'
;.;"'.' '•• :'- 2V-"-: • ; •
FAILURE CAUSE .
Prerotation in NaK
flow stream due to larj
number of bends in pumj
suction piping.
•
... . ' '..






 . ':'•?"• : ''''•' ' : . ' ' • " ' •
. ". .-, '"-• ."'. '-..;
Heat input to standby
IL NPMA from flowing ,
system NaK. . ,. •,.
' • • • • . • • > .- • . •
, .- _. - - . . ; • • ' ~-t ••'./•.









































inventory if .damaged oy el






'- • ••..•'':'. '."-









. . - •
• ••' ,*•••.
v. ' .











 ." '• ' »
hort.
••.•...'•' • 6 •;. ' '' • " ' ' •'
REMARKS .AND RECOMMENDATIONS
;Tests of . effect of NaK :'v-
suction line configuration
on; ^pump performance are









progress to evaluate need




. MODerate - One recorded occurrence.. : V ' '
LOW - No recorded occurrences. ,; . • ;
• * '_ •' . • . • • " • • . . - • / . -
** CRITICAL - Failure wbich aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard. ... \
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits. '•" ; i;- . ;-
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability ' : -r ' - ' • , ,
• , • of the system to perform its primary function. ' FIGURE III Page 5 • .
1*925:67:0126
POWER BYTE' DIVISION
FAILURE MODES AND ETFECTS ANALYSIS
:' •?••' V- •'•>"• *'::-"f^ (: ~^ 7^^ '~'^&*c^'':-
PART NO. nFsrRTPTTnH op FUNCTION; : '-' PAGE 6 .OF FMEA- •; '
PART NAME Peg : . " • . . . DATE 15 May 1970
LOOP ITEM NO. -..••-, '• INITIAL H3 REVISION PI
1
. FAILURE MODE.
8. NaK inventory in Hg •
loop.
9. Gas leaks into L/C
loop; loss of L/C inven-
tory to environment.
'. ' ; . 2 ' :: • •'' ' '
FAILURE CAUSE
Failure of weld joint ,
between Hg loop and
NaK HRL in condenser.




" ' ' .
a) L/C fittings assem-
bled without ferrules.
b) Poor fitup or mech-
anical damage of
swagelok or conpseal
fittings. • -','.'. '.,'.
' ..'<'• • • " ' ; " • - • ' " ' '.' ,""
.; .-- '-:,-. • ;••'' ••" ,";"-:-:'-- • " jr •' •
•' ''• -
; ;;










- . • - ^ . "•-,.:
. •- •
 r
 • ' • '. •' •'.'.'"




























' '• ' ' " •:':;-. •••'
.;•',• _ ' '-.-.'
'.,.'..-' • "--:.




















- '"•'*'".' ''• ' ' ...'






- ;'•..".. ' • ' • • • :• • . ' .
Consider double containment
of weld joints where NaK . -
' and Hg are oppo site; e.g...
PLE braze and weld joint. .:
'design.1 ••"•.'' ••.*,- ; ' • - " • ' ; ' '' :.
"'•.'•• . • •• •-..,'-•'"'• • .•'•
:V
-'-'--'." • ".'.' •
-•)•-•-. • • .'.''•- .''•'.• ' ,••• '' -• i'--~-- •' .'••'•
'•••
r
' ' •••>y.r. '/•^ ••.'•••. '^''K: 'c'^ V ';';'. '**'. ' "•
>/.-.;;. "•••-• ' :'' "... ''•.'•;' • 'J-'.:-;.* :: ^^ •:''- '? ~:~-:
• ..•••„' •.••>:. .'•"• •','"••'••"':. : '"'-'-.:'•'-."'' '-"•''•
QC surveillance of torquing
operations and the precedin)
joint,'- fitup.; '.*.:'••*<: '". ' J '
. Replace all-Sittings :with'
'weld-Joints or :.brBzed joint
In general, existing leaks
•wotild be discovered during
system Helium. leak check.





MODerate - One recorded occurrence.- ;
LOW - No recorded occurrences. .
 f
** CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits.
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability-
of the system to perform its primary function. ••• .-• .
 T,_ m^_' _T _ ,
• ;. • . ' ...... . FIGURE 111, rage o
1*925:67:0126
POWER SYTEh.. DIVISION





DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTION: PAGE 7 OF FMEA
ITEM NO.

















damage, or valve fails





ll..Current flow to sol-







































a) Provide pressure regula-
tion capability for L/C
.side of MJCReservoir to '•;?.
provide capability of con-,
.trolling mercury side..: -• :"
inventory. .'•/' -
b) Use high temperature
solenoid valve and insure ~.
that the proper ..operating
voltage is'available at.the
valve terminalSi V
Diode circuit is placed, in'.,"
parallel with the solenoid
coil and provide s a _ cur rent
path during valve .deactiva-
tion but an infinite .resis-
tance during actuation.
This procedure is used., durr;
irig .current SNAP-8 groiind .
tests. This diode circuit
HTOH ='l^o er isore oec-uri^nufes of
MODerate - One recorded occurrence.









 quirement for it iinposed oh
r
 . . the valve supplier during
** CRITICAL -Failure which aborts the test, in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard, acceptance.testing.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits. ' : : • • ' • - . • • ' • ' . ' . - - . " ' " ' > • ' : \ - . , •'V -
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability , >
of the system to perform its primary function. • ' • . • . '.i
.. . . . : FIGURE III, Page 7 ._ ' . ..
U925:6?:0126
POWER SYTE. : DIVISION




DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTION: PAGE 8. ; QF FMEA
' DATE 15 Mav 1070
ITEM NO. INITIALQ • REVISION






12. Radioactive NaK in
HRL.
Structural failure





13. Low flow to Hg'PMA.
. bearings. . ... '.
L/C pressure at nozzle
inlet is'too low (l :
psia) and any dirt
accumulation will have










a) Current double contain-
ment of RPL components ':•".-''
restricts the possibility
of this happening; however,
the point documented here
is that the .static NaK
reservoirs for the double
contained components, should
be independent so that a
single failure in two dif-
ferent components 'does not
permit radioactive NaK to '-
enter the HRL. : ' .
b) Instrument,the PCS-NaK
loops to detect 'this faijLuri
a) Decrease the nunjber of
Hg Pump bearing nozzles to
increase the required inlet
pressure.; This has been
proposed and previously. .
accepted. '. Followup to
insure\that it,ia accom-.;'
IFH1 .-.^ e 6F
MOLerate - One recorded occurrence. - ; ; 1 / •
LOW - No recorded occurrences. . . • • ' • '
- - • • " • ' *
** CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits.
MINOR'"- Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability.
of the system to perform its primary function. . . . . ,' FIGURE III, Page 8
1*985:67:0126
POWER SYTQL DIVISION



















Ik.a. Decomposition .of. ..
Mix I*P3E. . •
b. Line heater open •
circuit.
c. Line heater short
circuit.
Poor heat.transfer
from line heater to
L/C fluid or excessive































•* HiOi! -i- IVr er were oeoupfenaes'of failure sibde la
MODerate - One recorded occurrence.
LOW - No recorded occurrences.
<§*§ In HgPMA
and TAA.
a) ^Investigate' methodS-: of •
thermally bonding the line
heaters to the- piping.to
prevent local hot spots ...
during vacuum operation. .'•':<:
;b), Distribute the line
heaters over the entire
piping system instead of '
providing localized heat,
sources in order to decreas
the required heater watt
density. '....;• : .";..'. -•'.-:..; V.:'.''••• '.•
c) Use heaters that operate
below the decomposition ,
temperature of Mix UP3E ;
(500*F to 600°F use temper-
ature) ; for example ,'.cal-
rod heaters can operate at
temperature 3 over 1600 *F if
heat transfer is poor.- .
** CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits. '.: • . .
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability
of-the system to perform its primary function. ; ' .
FIGURE, III,. Page 9.
U925:67:0126
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PAGE '10 -OF FMEA • .;•"
DATE 15 May 1970
INITIALS REVISIONO








,- • ..-••'• 6 :/ ••-•-;•.••.••..-.-.' .
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
15. Decrease in L/C PMA
suction pressure. ..











Low Critical There are many paths for
loss of L/C inventory - -
Increased leakage in HgPMA
due to larger dynamic seal
tolerances, '(per TM ^ 932:
69-605, 6 times the origi-
nal L/C losses .are expected
storage of oil in the MpMA
motor statbr, startup/shut-
down losses; etc. "Towards
the end of life or after
many startup cycles the,.,
reservoir pressure will
decrease markedly from the
initial value unless there.
is a large inventory avail-
able . Increasing the y"',
initial pressure i;s not a'...-
satisfactory answer because
that would directly increas*
pump and TAA ,slinger losses
and.decrease net system ' :
power output. , The recently
IliuH - TWO of Mtife; eift-urreuaee Of failure mode ih
MODerate - One recorded occurrence. ' '.'
LOW - No recorded occurrences. -
to affl§liuffcU tills; glt-Uationi .J»i °hy- ;
.' event, the L/C reservoir requirements should
be reviewed in light of increased inventory
losses. .« .. " • ' ...'•,.-...'•-. " .-..
** CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test, in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard. :
 :v, '••".... . ;. •
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits. . :s •
 : ,
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability. ' ;
 ;,-
: of the system to perform its primary function. . • • ' . ' ' . • .. . .
'
 ; . ; FIGURE III, Page 10 V
U925:67:0126
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PAGE 11 Of -FMEA .
DATE 15 May'1970 : '
INITIAL EJ REVISION
' 1






16. Loss of system .inyen-
;ories for standby PCS.
Rupture of fluid con-
tainment structure,
due to failure of
reservoir latching .




PCS inopera- Low Critical The reservoir•specification
requires .that .the reservoir:
should be provided with: some
type of latching'device to
preclude damage during launc h
due to fluid hammer. During
ground test the latching
mechanism (e.g./valve at in-
let to reservoir "to, keep ;
loop fluids from 'surging ;
during launch) should.be
deactuated so that the . -•
reservoirs can^ absorb " . . - • ;
thermal growth of the stand-
by loop inventories/, '.;
':. i
.. * HIGH » IVo or wore oewurrcru'rie ef failure mode In telling.
MODerate. - One recorded occurrence. !
LOW - No recorded occurrences. ; . .
'•
*'*. CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits.
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability
of the system to perform its primary function. . ./ ; •••••.'
FIGURE III, Page 11.
U925:67:0126
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DESCRIPTIOH OF FUHCTIOH: PAGE .OF FMEA'
DATE 15 May .1970











17. Cracking of IL piping
near IfPMA/fatigue and
di?;tortion effects in















Low Critical Maintain requirement that :
NaK diverter valve permit
some recirculatioh of NaK
through standby pump.. V




* I! 10!! - Two of ffl6i!p oeourffeiioes. of.
MODerate - One recorded occurrence.
LOW - No recorded occurrences .
fiiutle.iii testing*
*• CRITICAL - Failure which aborts the test in progress or creates an intolerable safety hazard.
MAJOR - A failure or performance degradation in excess of tolerance limits.
MINOR - Failures other than critical or major which have no significant effect on the ability.
of the system to perform its primary function. FIGURE III, Page.12
1*925:67:0126
M A J O R P C S C O N T I N U A T I O N A C T I V I T I E S
RESOLVE CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REVIEW ACTION ITEMS
FABRICATE A FULL SCALE PCS MOCKUP
DETAILED DESIGN OF COMPONENT AND PIPE SUPPORTS
PREPARE COMPONENT PART I SPECIFICATIONS
FIGURE IV A
• . : < • - P C S PROGRAM SiJM.VURV



































SNAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
670 009
L . :.«
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SNAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM AND NUCLEAR SYSTEM
AEROJET-GENERAL CORP.
: • :h2 : , Phol ography







SNAP-8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM WITH SHADOW SHIELDED REACTOR
670 006
AEROJET-GENERAL CORP.
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